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Abstract  
The Canadian law enforcement Mr. Big operation continues to pose the risk of producing false 
confessions and, therefore, miscarriages of justice. Some case law protections available to 
prevent suspects from making incriminating statements are explicitly inapplicable to confessions 
elicited from Mr. Big stings. The R v Hart (2014) common law rules have adequately helped to 
address this by further analyzing the particular circumstances of a Mr. Big operation in the 
pursuit of justice. The application of the R v Hart regulations has led to the inadmissibility of 
several confessions and one exoneration. However, it did not exhaustively address all of the 
collective grievances associated with the Canadian technique. The manner in which the R v Hart 
common law rule is applied varies between cases. Several cases are compared to Hart’s personal 
drastic circumstance, which by contrast reduces the perceived abuse of process. With increasing 
police accountability, the use of violent inducements have decreased, and financial inducements 
prevail. The possibility of injustice derived from this operation is still troubling. Canadians need 
more applicable legal protections.  
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A Critical Assessment of Mr. Big Operations by Canada’s Police 
The Canadian Mr. Big interrogation technique is an undercover policing, confession-
producing technique where the suspect is not cognizant that they are providing self-incriminating 
evidence (Smith, Stinson, & Patry, 2010, p. 39; Holmgren, 2017, p. 148). This tactic has been 
subjected to controversy. The risk of inducing false confessions and the deception aspect of the 
technique is found morally reprehensible by members of the public (Puddister & Riddell, 2012, 
p. 386). It is illegal in some countries (United States, England, and Germany), and disapproved 
of by wrongful conviction advocators, civil rights groups, academics, and defense attorneys; yet 
is highly commended by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) for its efficacy in 
producing confessions (R v MM, 2015, p. 2; Puddister & Riddell, 2012, p. 386-387). The lack of 
legal protections available to subjects of Mr. Big interrogations led the Supreme Court of 
Canada, within the R v Hart (2014) case, to create a new common law, two-pronged confession 
rule (R v Hart, 2014, p. 580-581).  
Research Question 
This literature review seeks to identify the characteristics of Mr. Big operations in Canada 
before the 2014 R v Hart decision, classify any concerns and benefits of the technique, identify 
case law precedents and the legal protections available to individuals who are subjected to this 
type of investigation, describe the implementation of the R v Hart decision and critique its 
impact and application to post-R v Hart cases.  
Methodology 
By way of inductive and unobtrusive secondary data collection, a combination of pre-
existing research, precedent cases, news articles, a dictionary, and an autobiography, the topic 
was examined to provide a clear illustration of the tactic and identify any trends (van den 
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Hoonaard, 2019, p. 145-146). This is a qualitative case analysis that sought to describe and 
clarify (University of Southern California, 2019, para. 11). Case precedents that have altered the 
legal standing of the covert operation were then systematically explored and summarised to 
demonstrate the development of these investigations and to establish the current protections 
available to its subjects. The legal protections were then scrutinized with regards to specific 
cases in conjunction with the secondary research findings. The combination of explorative, case-
study, and historical analysis research designs were used to complete a comprehensive 
comparative analysis of the undercover investigation before and after the implementation of case 
laws (University of Southern California, 2019, para. 11 & 33).  
Limitations.  The majority of post-2014 cases are appeals from cases that were originally 
tried pre-R v Hart. At this time, there are very few documented post-R v Hart Mr. Big 
operations. In this research, R v Buckley (2018) is the only post-R v Hart Mr. Big operation that 
was analyzed, any comparisons made to R v Buckley cannot represent all post-R v Hart Mr. Big 
operations. The degree to which the logic of a decision is discussed varies between cases. When 
a guilty plea is entered, the case is rarely included in public databases (Keenan & Brockman, 
2010, p. 28). Guilty pleas derived from plea bargains are generally unavailable for review. The 
research did not exhaustively analyze all Mr. Big cases available and no two operations are 
identical. Cases that are tried by a jury have not been formally written up, thus the case facts that 
led to the decision are unavailable. Cases labeled as something other than “Mr. Big”, such as 
“l’opération d’infiltration” or simply “undercover police operation” may have been overlooked 
(Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 27). Reverse undercover sting operations whereby police officers 
pose as an individual trying to purchase narcotics from a potential drug trafficker is beyond the 
scope of this thesis and was not discussed (c R Busner, 2010, p. 1).  
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PART ONE – Case Summaries 
What is Mr. Big?  
Mr. Big stings are operationalized as a Canadian undercover investigation technique  
fashioned to elicit confessions from a person highly suspected of having committed a crime,  
when forensic evidence is or is almost unavailable (Puddister & Riddell, 2012, p. 385-386;  
Smith, Stinson, & Patry, 2009, p. 169; Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 12 & 15). To begin, 
undercover operatives will observe their suspect for weeks, even months, until they feel they 
have gathered enough information about the suspect’s routines, how the suspect operates, the 
suspect’s financial and social situation, and personality (Murphy & Anderson, 2016, p. 31; 
Connors, Archibald, Smith, & Patry, 2017, p. 27; Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 19). At times, 
the police will further explore the personality of their suspect by conferring with psychologists 
and behavioral profilers (Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 19) Then, an undercover police officer 
will befriend the suspect (Smith, Stinson, & Patry, 2010, p. 39). The initial encounter between 
the suspect and the operative occurs through an activity or venue the suspect frequents (R v MM, 
2012, p. 26; Connors et al., 2017, p. 27). The operative may frequent the venue regularly prior to 
approaching the suspect (Connors et al., 2017, p.27). The operative may also wait until 
approached by the suspect (Connors et al., 2017, p. 27). If attempts to befriend the suspect fails, 
police may pose as a recruiter, offering the suspect a high-paying job (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 5). 
Officers have also attempted to engage with the suspect through a judicially approved vehicle 
break-in; whereby, both the suspect’s vehicle and an undercover operative’s vehicle, parked near 
one another, have their windows smashed and belongings stolen (R v Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 2). 
Over the course of several months, the operative will spend a substantial amount of time 
with the suspect, establishing a genuine relationship of trust and friendship (Moore, Copeland, & 
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Schuller, 2009, p. 348; Smith et al., 2010, p. 39). The undercover operative will lucratively treat 
the suspect to nights out to night clubs, strip clubs, comedy clubs, casinos, and/or bars, gradually 
exposing the subject to a staged glamourous lifestyle (Murphy & Anderson, 2016, p. 31; Bates, 
2018, p. 122; Smith et al., 2010, p. 39; R v Magoon, 2015, p. 9). The pair may also travel 
together, within Canada, with paid hotel and meal accommodations (Murphy & Anderson, 2016, 
p. 31). A female suspect may be treated to spa nights (R v Magoon, 2015, p. 9). Male suspects 
may be lured in by undercover women (Puddister and Riddell, 2012, p. 386).  
Luring and Recruiting  
The officer will eventually disclose that there is a darker side to his prosperous business  
(Holmgren, 2017, p. 148; Smith et al., 2009, p. 169-170). They will introduce the suspect to  
multiple officers posing as high-ranking members of a criminal organization (Puddister &  
Riddell, 2012, p. 385-386; Smith et al., 2010, p. 39). The suspect will be exposed to vast  
amounts of cash and hired as a bodyguard, and/or to complete simple jobs, such as counting  
money, cashing in casino chips, picking up and delivering packages, or collecting people’s 
license plate numbers (Bates, 2018, p. 121; Smith et al., 2010, p. 39; Keenan & Brockman, 2010, 
p. 20; Moore, 2019, p. 4). An underage suspect may be recruited into fabricated videogame fraud 
(R v NRR, 2014, p. 2). The suspect will be generously compensated for their work, up to several 
thousand dollars per week (Smith et al., 2010, p. 39). The fictitious criminal organization will 
expose the suspect to, and will involve the suspect in a series of fabricated pseudo-crimes such as 
drug trafficking, money laundering, credit-card fraud, kidnappings, assaults, and mafia-like 
murder to depict an authentic sense of corruption (Holmgren, 2017, p. 148; Puddister & Riddell, 
2012, p. 386; Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 20). As the suspect’s responsibilities increase, their 
financial rewards increase (R v Ledesma, 2020, p. 4). Recurring themes of loyalty and honesty 
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are repeated by members and clearly presented as valuable assets to the syndicate (Keenan & 
Brockman, 2010, p. 13). The suspect is informed that those who breach this unwritten rule are 
physically punished (Murphy & Anderson, 2016, p. 31). The organization will perform simulated 
acts of violence against persons who betray their trust and/or to “snitches” (R v Hart, 2014, p. 
571). The goal is to educate the suspect that betrayal of trust is unacceptable; yet criminal 
activity is tolerated (R v Magoon, 2015, p. 8).  
Enticing the Suspect to Confess 
To generate a reaction out of the suspect, the police may present, to the target, a fake 
police document illustrating that they are the primary suspect of a grave crime (R v Yakimchuk, 
2017, p. 4; Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 21). The intention here is to first instill fear, then to 
initiate a conversation about the crime in question between the undercover operative and the 
suspect. To accomplish this, the police may also release details to the media pertaining to the 
suspect’s involvement in the crime, such as a sketch from a fake witness, or video footage of the 
suspect in a convenience store (R v Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 4; R v Ledesma, 2020, p. 5). This often 
initiates the first confession (R v MM, 2012, p. 32; R v Yakimchuk, 2017, p.4). If not, it 
encourages the suspect to open up about the topic.  
Meeting Mr. Big     
For police to build their case against the suspect, they strive to produce another, but 
filmed, confession. The suspect is informed that to move up in the organization, or to become a 
full-fledged member, he must first meet the head of the organization, colloquially known as “Mr. 
Big” (Puddister & Riddell, 2012, p. 386; Schleichkorn, 2013, p. 389). The suspect’s meeting 
with Mr. Big is conducted as a job interview of sorts (Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 20; R v 
Hart, 2014, p. 545). Mr. Big is portrayed as a well-connected, confident, yet menacing, 
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omnipotent person (Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 20). Mr. Big requests that the suspect reveal 
any past criminality to him to establish trust and prevent any eventual quandaries (Puddister & 
Riddell, 2012, p. 386; Schleichkorn, 2013, p. 389). He explains to the suspect that in case the 
suspect tries to inform the police, or deliberately put the “criminal organization” at risk of 
exposure, he needs  “dirt” against the suspect for the organization’s personal protection (Smith et 
al., 2010, p. 39-40). To secure the suspect’s promotion, and to prove his loyalty to the 
organization, the suspect must provide a detailed, oral and/or written, confession to the crime in 
question (Schleichkorn, 2013, p. 390; Smith et al., 2010, p. 40). The suspect’s meeting with Mr. 
Big is covertly videotaped by police (Smith et al., 2010, p. 40).   
Obtaining the Filmed Confession  
Throughout the interview with Mr. Big, Mr. Big will often disclose the crime at hand, and 
demand a confession to it (R v Hart, 2014, p. 545). It is made palpable to the suspect, by Mr. 
Big, that a confession to this specific crime will grant the suspect acceptance into the 
organization (R v Hart, 2014, p. 571). Depending on whether the first attempt to obtain a 
confession was successful, Mr. Big will often inform the suspect that he has access to compelling 
evidence against the suspect and refusing to confess will demonstrate dishonesty and disloyalty 
(R v Hart, 2014, p. 571-572). Mr. Big dismisses all denials of guilt as lies (R v Hart, 2014, p. 
572).  
Mr. Big may then offer the suspect legal help for any prior crimes through the 
organization’s “contacts” (Smith et al., 2010, p. 40). More specifically, Mr. Big may offer to help 
sue the police for harassment (Connors, et al., 2017, p. 27). Mr. Big may also suggest to the 
suspect that they know someone who is willing to confess to the suspect’s crime(s), on the 
suspect’s behalf, for a price, either fiscal or procedural (Smith et al., 2010, p. 40). To lend 
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credibility, Mr. Big may also say that they know someone, dying of cancer in prison, who owes 
them a favor, willing to confess on the suspect’s behalf (Connors et al., 2017, p. 27). In some 
instances, Mr. Big has promised the suspect that they would help destroy any evidence of the 
crime, or that Mr. Big knows ‘crooked’ police officers willing to get rid of the evidence (Smith 
et al., 2010, p. 40; Connors et al., 2017, p. 27). The suspect is informed of the repercussions of 
not confessing: the loss of a high-paying and accommodating livelihood (Smith et al., 2010, p. 
40). The beating, and perhaps even murder, of another member of the organization may be 
staged—as a result of the other member refusing to confess (Smith et al., 2010, p. 40; 
Schleichkorn, 2013, p. 397). Undercover officers normally simulate the brutal, bloody assault of 
a person who had lied to or otherwise betrayed the organization (R v Hart, 2014, p. 571; Murphy 
& Anderson, 2016, p. 31). A confession is elicited through subordination. The degree of violent 
threats varies from case to case, but it is not uncommon for a suspect to fear for their life as a 
result of not confessing (Holmgren, 2017, p. 155).  
Mr. Big investigations have lasted several months and can even take multiple years 
(Holmgren, 2017, p. 149). Up to 50 undercover officers may be hired for a Mr. Big operation 
(Smith et al., 2010, p. 40). Each individual investigation can cost taxpayers hundreds of 
thousands, and even millions of dollars (Schleichkorn, 2013, p. 389; Keenan & Brockman, 2010, 
p. 23-24). The costs and time-consuming aspects of undercover work results in it only being used 
for very serious offences like murder, terrorism, drug offences, sex offences, serious acts of 
violence, and cold cases (Parent & Parent, 2018, p. 80; R v Hart, 2014, p. 579). Hundreds of 
cases have been solved using the Mr. Big technique (R v Hart, p. 570; Puddister & Riddell, 2012, 
p. 386). Between 1990 and 2008, the technique was used at least 350 times (R v Hart, 2014, p. 
570).   
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Cody Bates’ Story from his Perspective 
Cody Bates was a drug-trafficker and severe drug addict with a relatively extensive 
criminal record in Calgary, Alberta (R v Bates, 2009, p. 3-4; Bates, 2018, p. 68, 73, 79-85 & 
105). In 2006, Bates and Justin Gittens planned the robbery of Ali Khamis, another known drug-
trafficker in the area (R v Bates, 2009, p. 2). There were rumors that Khamis was planning on 
robbing Bates and Gittens, so they decided to “defend their turf” (Bates, 2018, p. 87; R v Bates, 
2009, p. 2). Bates offered Jason Woods, a crack-cocaine user, a generous amount of cocaine to 
help him with the robbery (R v Bates, 2009, p. 2; Bates, 2018, p. 87). Woods called Khamis from 
a payphone to purchase drugs (Bates, 2018, p. 87). Then Bates and Gittens pulled up to the 
meeting point and Gittens slipped the gun up his sleeve (Bates, 2018, p. 87). Woods, according 
to plan, did not have enough money for the drugs (Bates, 2018, p. 87; R v Bates, 2009, p. 2). 
Bates and Gittens approached Khamis’ vehicle to rob him, whereby suddenly, Gittens shot and 
killed Khamis, at close range (Bates, 2018, p. 87). Things did not go according to plan and 
Gittens was in tears (Bates, 2018, p. 88). They ran away in shock, buried the gun, and went their 
separate ways (Bates, 2018, p. 88).  
Months later, Bates was on his way to deliver drugs in Marda Loop, a neighborhood in 
Calgary, when police tackled him to the ground (Bates, 2018, p. 106). The police found his 
cocaine, poured it out, and told him that they had done him a favor, now they needed a favor in 
return (Bates, 2018, p. 106). They wanted to know who his provider was (Bates, 2018, p. 106). 
Bates gave them a false answer, was released, then subsequently arrested later that day on an old 
transit ticket warrant (Bates, 2018, p. 106). He was placed in a holding cell where he met a man 
named Rob (Bates, 2018, p. 106).  
 Weeks later, when Bates was walking out of a convenience store in High River, Alberta, 
he came across Rob (Bates, 2018, p. 118). Rob was accompanied by Brad and Walker, some 
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biker-gang looking fellows, and invited Bates to join them to a bar (Bates, 2018, p. 118). They 
spent the evening drinking, laughing, and telling stories (Bates, 2018, p. 118). Bates felt like 
these guys really liked him (Bates, 2018, p. 118). When Rob payed the bill, Bates noticed his 
large stack of hundred-dollar bills, as well as the 50 percent tip he gave the waitress (Bates, 
2018, p. 118). 
 Later, once Bates had returned to his Calgary drug operation routine, managing several 
drug runners, he received a call from Walker, Rob’s biker friend (Bates, 2018, p. 99 & 119). 
Walker needed a favor (Bates, 2018, p. 119). Bates agreed, and Walker picked him up (Bates, 
2018, p. 119). Bates felt like he was starting to get close with his new friend (Bates, 2018, p. 
119). He enjoyed Walker’s company, and felt like he could trust him (Bates, 2018, p. 119). 
Walker drove Bates to a mall and requested that he discreetly pick up a briefcase from a locker, 
refrain from looking inside the briefcase, and deliver it to him (Bates, 2018, p. 119). Walker 
could not be seen on camera (Bates, 2018, p. 119). Bates felt that, through this, he had an in with 
some reputable gangsters (Bates, 2018, p. 119). Bates admired Walker (Bates, 2018, p. 119). He 
obliged, picked up the briefcase, and wondered whether he was carrying body parts, drugs, or 
money (Bates, 2018, p. 119). He did not check (Bates, 2018, p. 119).  
Once the task was complete, Walker invited Bates out to drink where he whispered into 
Bates’ ear that this was a test and that he had passed because he had abstained from asking any 
questions (Bates, 2018, p. 120). Walker then informed Bates that Rob wanted to connect with 
him the following day to negotiate a work opportunity and placed a large stack of hundred-dollar 
bills in Bates’ hand (Bates, 2018, p. 120). Bates held himself together but was bursting with 
excitement on the inside (Bates, 2018, p. 120). This was the easiest money he had ever made 
(Bates, 2018, p. 120).  
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Rob treated Bates to lunch where he explained to Bates that he was going to meet 
someone at a bar later, and needed Bates to observe and acquire the vehicle make, model, and 
license plate number of this person (Bates, 2018, p. 121). Bates later entered the bar in question 
(Bates, 2018, p. 121). He saw Rob walk in several minutes later and sit at a different table where 
he was later joined by the said individual (Bates, 2018, p. 121). Bates felt like he was becoming a 
part of something big like the Mafia and he had to play the part, act cool (Bates, 2018, p. 121). 
He waited for the right moment, headed to the parking lot, and memorized the license plate 
number (Bates, 2018, p. 121). Later, Rob handed him another handful of hundred-dollar bills 
(Bates, 2018, p. 121). Bates was baffled at how easily he had just secured several thousands of 
dollars (Bates, 2018, p. 121).  
Bates believed these men were part of an extremely sophisticated criminal organization 
(Bates, 2018, p. 122). Over the course of several months these men involved Bates in gun-
running, robberies, and immeasurable unlawful projects and tasks (Bates, 2018, p. 122). Bates’ 
friendship with Rob and his team grew stronger (Bates, 2018, p. 122). He was using cocaine 
consistently throughout this time (Bates, 2018, p. 122). Rob and his friends expressed a genuine 
concern about his addiction (Bates, 2018, p. 122). Bates felt that these men truly cared about his 
well-being (Bates, 2018, p. 122). He was thrilled whenever he was tasked with another 
assignment (Bates, 2018, p.  122). Bates was well-off, living glamorously, drinking at strip clubs 
with Rob and friends every other day (Bates, 2018, p. 122).  
Eventually, the criminal organization disclosed to Bates that he was the suspect in a 
murder and that this was attracting too much attention to the organization (Bates, 2018, p. 122). 
Bates was distraught (Bates, 2018, p. 122). These men were his family, he told them he would do 
anything for them, even kill (Bates, 2018, p. 122). Bates was directed to speak to a man referred 
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to as a “clean-up man” who specialized in disposing of evidence (Bates, 2018, p. 122). Upon 
meeting the clean-up man, Bates felt he needed to boast to secure his high paying job (Bates, 
2018, p. 122). Bates proceeded to lie and tell the clean-up man that he had meticulously planned 
the homicide, and that he had pulled the trigger (R v Hart, 2014, p. 572; Bates, 2018, p. 122). 
The clean-up man was impressed (Bates, 2018, p. 122). Bates was being promoted to a hitman 
(Bates, 2018, p. 123). He was in over his head; his life had reached a new level (Bates, 2018, p. 
123).  
One morning, Bates was woken by a phone call from Rob asking him where he was 
(Bates, 2018, p. 125). Suddenly, a loud bang broke his door open (Bates, 2018, p. 125). It was 
the Calgary SWAT team ordering him to get on the ground (Bates, 2018, p. 125). They executed 
a search warrant for which Bates felt relief knowing they would not find anything (Bates, 2018, 
p. 125). He kept his drugs and weapons at a different location (Bates, 2018, p. 125). A couple 
dozen police officers were in his house (Bates, 2018, p. 126). He recognized the police officer 
who had dumped out his cocaine in hopes of finding Bates’ provider, the preceding year (Bates, 
2018, p. 126). Bates was placed under arrest for first degree murder (Bates, 2018, p. 126).   
As he sat in a police interrogation room trying to determine how the police could possibly 
think he had committed a premeditated murder, it dawned on him (Bates, 2018, p. 127). Rob and 
all his associates were undercover police officers (Bates, 2018, p. 127). He suddenly felt sick 
(Bates, 2018, p. 127). Men he had come to consider as brothers, his family, had betrayed him 
(Bates, 2018, p. 127). The past several months replayed in his head (Bates, 2018, p. 127). 
Obeying an unwritten code; Bates could not inform the police that Gittens had pulled the trigger 
(Bates, 2018, p.  127). Bates knew he was culpable, but not of this exact charge (Bates, 2018, p. 
127). Exhausted after two days of interrogation, he was later placed in a holding cell with 
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Woods, his crack-cocaine addicted accomplice (Bates, 2018, p. 127). Woods had not seen who 
shot the gun but confided in Bates that he had mentioned the incident to his Alcoholics 
Anonymous sponsor (Bates, 2018, p. 128). Bates instantly assumed Woods’ sponsor was also a 
police officer, which would solidify the case against him (Bates, 2018, p. 128).  
When Bates was in custody, he was informed that he had succumbed to a Mr. Big 
operation (Bates, 2018, p. 131). He quickly learned that countless accused murderers had been 
the subject of this type of investigation in the past, which immediately lead him to wonder how 
many more of these convicted murderers had also falsely confessed (Bates, 2018, p. 131).  
Bates had a general understanding of prison politics and quickly joined a gang and 
followed their rules for personal protection (Bates, 2018, p. 132). The gang he joined had a well-
known rival-group and each group was known for the deaths and frequent acts of violence 
against the other (Bates, 2018, p. 137). To establish his tough-guy reputation in prison and to 
prevent becoming the victim of violent crime, Bates became a frequent perpetrator of violent acts 
against enemies of his gang (Bates, 2018, p. 136-140). Bates was eventually transferred to 
Edmonton Remand (Bates, 2018, p. 140). He maintained his tough and violent reputation and 
was frequently placed in solitary confinement for months at a time (Bates, 2018, p. 142-143). 
Believing he would be spending a life sentence in prison, Bates carelessly took part in violent 
murder plots in prison alongside his new gang (Bates, 2018, p. 147-148).  
Eventually, Bates’ lawyer visited him in prison (Bates, 2018, p. 156). Gittens had turned 
himself in as the trigger man in the robbery (Bates, 2018, p. 156). Later, the Alberta court 
assessed Bates’ mens rea, and the shooting was deemed accidental (R v Bates, 2009, p. 5). Bates’ 
excessive criminal history and role in the robbery were aggravating factors, yet his young age 
and guilty plea were deemed mitigating (R v Bates, 2009, p. 5-6). He was convicted of 
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manslaughter and sentenced to eight years (Bates, 2018, p. 162). Given his time served and the 
two-for-one time in solitary confinement, he would serve the next five years in an Edmonton 
maximum security prison (Bates, 2018, p. 163).  
Interrogation Trilogy 
R v Oickle, R v Singh, and R v Sinclair constitute the three Supreme Court of Canada 
cases that make up the Interrogation Trilogy (Dufraimont, 2011, p. 310). Together, these cases 
outline the legal protections available to suspects when subjected to a police interrogation 
(Dufraimont, 2011, p. 310).  
R v Oickle - The Confession Rule 
Oickle, after many hours of interrogation, eventually confessed to setting seven out of 
eight fires (Dufraimont, 2011, p. 311). The tactic employed by interrogating officers, which was 
to repeatedly accuse him of guilt based on his failed polygraph test, resulted in his confession, 
even as the unreliability of the polygraph test was not made known to the suspect (Dufraimont, 
2011, p. 311).  
The original common law confession rule, dating back a couple of centuries, states that 
any statement made outside of court by an accused to an evident person of authority must be 
omitted from evidence unless the Crown can prove that the statement was made voluntarily, 
beyond a reasonable doubt (Dufraimont, 2011, p. 311). R v Oickle led to the creation of 
guidelines when exploring the “voluntariness” of a confession (Dufraimont, 2011, p. 311). When 
considering “voluntariness,” oppression, subtle threats or promises, and police trickery must be 
carefully examined (R v Oickle, 2000, p. 5). The police may induce a confession. The mere 
incidence of police inducements is not problematic, as very little confessions are given 
impromptu (R v Oickle, 2000, p. 37). The inducement becomes questionable when it raises 
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reasonable doubt that it may have overborne the will of the interrogatee (R v Oickle, 2000, p. 37). 
Whether it be in the form of a threat or a promise, the offer of a quid pro quo, by interrogators, 
should be explored (R v Oickle, 2000, p. 5). Depriving a suspect of necessities such as: access to 
counsel, medical attention, food, water, clothing, sleep, questioning for an extensive period of 
time, or presenting one with fabricated evidence is considered oppressive and affects the 
voluntariness of the confession (R v Oickle, 2000, p. 5). If the suspect’s mind is not operating 
properly, the confession is deemed involuntary (Dufraimont, 2011, p. 312).  
When considering whether a confession was made voluntarily or not, the use of police 
trickery must be explored (R v Oickle, 2011, p. 6). Some confessions obtained through police 
trickery may not undermine the voluntariness or right to silence of the suspect, but must be 
excluded for its circumstances would be disapproved of by the community (R v Oickle, 2000, p. 
6; Dufraimont, 2011, p. 312). The confession rule applies whether the suspect is or is not 
detained (R v Singh, 2007, p. 423).  
R v Hebert – The Right to Silence 
Although the right to silence is not explicitly mentioned in the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledges that Section 7 of the Charter 
protects this right (Dufraimont, 2011, p. 313). R v Hebert objectively defines the right to silence 
as: the right to choose to speak with authorities; however, the subjective component is ensuring 
the suspect is not deprived of an operating mind (1990, p. 181-182 & 184).  
R v Hebert was a case about a suspect who chose to exercise his right to silence, but was 
duped, by an undercover officer in his jail cell, into making incriminating statements 
(Dufraimont, 2011, p. 313). R v Hebert established the four following rules for the right to 
silence: 
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(1) Police are permitted to question an accused when counsel is not present (1990, p. 
183). So long as the police is not undercover and the accused voluntarily provides information, 
the Charter is not infringed (R v Hebert, 1990, p. 183). This is because an accused has the right 
to waive his or her right to silence; however, had they not known they were speaking with an 
officer, they would have been denied this right (R v Hebert, 1990, p. 183). This applies to 
undercover officer interrogations, information heard through mechanical devices, and overheard 
information and conversations between others (eg. in prison cells) (R v Hebert, 1990, p. 183).    
 (2) The right to silence only applies after the suspect has been formally detained (R v 
Hebert, 1990, p. 184). The Charter does not extend the right to counsel nor the right to silence 
pre-detention (R v Hebert, 1990, p. 184). Thus, statements made by a suspect during undercover 
operations, or pre-detention police tricks are accepted as evidence (R v Hebert, 1990, p. 184). 
 (3) Regardless of whether the police obtained information through a jailhouse informant 
or an undercover operative, a violation of the right to silence only occurs when police have 
overthrown the accused’s right to choose to remain silent (R v Herbert, 1990, p. 184). For 
instance, a violation would occur had the accused professed his desire to remain silent and the 
police engaged in subterfuge to prompt a statement (R v Hebert, 1990, p. 185). The police have 
then deprived the accused of his right to choose freely whether to make a statement (R v Hebert, 
1990, p. 185).  
(4) It is important to distinguish between undercover operatives observing a suspect 
versus undercover operatives eliciting information from a suspect in contravention to his or her 
right to choose to remain silent (R v Hebert, 1990, p. 184-185). A violation to this rule would be 
if the police elicited information from a suspect by bluffing and engaging in dishonesty (R v 
Hebert, 1990, p. 184-185). However, an officer and/or informant merely listening is not an 
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infringement (R v Hebert, 1990, p. 184).  It must be demonstrated that action was taken to 
deceitfully elicit information (R v Hebert, 1990, p. 183-185; Dufraimont, 2011, p. 313). It is 
assumed that the suspect has acknowledged the risks associated with statements made to non-
police officers (R v Hebert, 1990, p. 185).   
 Accordingly, Hebert professing his right to silence in police detention, then police 
proceeding to trick him into incriminating himself to an undercover operative in his cell was an 
infringement of his right to silence (R v Hebert, 1990, p. 181-185; Dufraimont, 2011, p. 313). 
The link between the right to silence and the R v Oickle confession rule’s “vonluntariness” was 
unclear until R v Singh (Dufraimont, 2011, p. 314).  
R v Singh.  A stray bullet killed an innocent bystander outside of a pub, for which Singh 
was arrested (R v Singh, 2007, p. 405). While being interrogated for second degree murder, the 
accused professed his right to silence eighteen times (Dufraimont, 2011, p. 314; R v Singh, 2007, 
p. 415). The officer began placing evidence before Singh (R v Singh, 2007, p. 411). Police 
proceeded with the interrogation while acknowledging, yet dismissing, Singh’s desire to remain 
silent, which eventually prompted him into making some incriminating statements (Dufraimont, 
2011, p. 314). He did not confess to the crime but identified himself in pictures taken from the 
video surveillance camera of the pub where the homicide occurred (R v Singh, 2007, p. 411). The 
judge ruled that Singh’s statements were voluntary, and that their probative value outweighed 
any prejudicial effects (R v Singh, 2007, p. 411). Hence, he was convicted (R v Singh, 2007, p. 
411).  
Singh’s case was appealed to determine whether the statements he made after he 
professed his right to silence were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, and if this was a breach 
of his section 7 right to silence (R v Singh, 2007, p. 415). The court emphasized that when one 
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knows he or she is speaking to an officer, an operating mind is imperative (R v Singh, 2007, p. 
420). An officer may use the following phrase, in simple wording, to inform an accused of their 
right to silence: “You are charged with … do you wish to say anything? You are not obligated to, 
and anything you say could be used in court” (R v Singh, 2007, p. 423). The lack of a warning, or 
the presence of one does not determine the admissibility of a statement, but it is an important 
consideration when determining voluntariness (R v Singh, 2007, p. 423). If the detainee has 
exercised his right to counsel, he will have been informed of his right to silence (R v Singh, 2007, 
p. 424). However, if he has not spoken with counsel, whether the police inform the detainee of 
his or her right to silence will, to a greater extent, be used to determine the voluntariness of a 
confession (R v Singh, 2007, p. 424).  
One’s right to remain silent is not synonymous with a right not to be spoken to (R v 
Singh, 2007, p. 421). Trying to elicit information from a suspect is not problematic as it is an 
investigator’s job to uncover information about a crime (R v Singh, 2007, p. 421). R v Oickle’s 
confession rule protects against reprehensible interrogation techniques that could prompt false 
confessions (R v Singh, 2007, p. 421). This case linked R v Oickle’s confession rule with R v 
Herbert’s pre-trial right to silence (R v Singh, 2007, p. 410-411).  
The principle against self-incrimination.  The confession rule and the right to silence 
are dominant components of the principle against self-incrimination (R v Singh, 2007, p. 418). 
These two rules can compliment one another but must remain distinct, as the common law 
confession rule is applied both before and after detention, and section 7 of the Charters’ right to 
silence only applies after detention (R v Singh, 2007, p. 444). One has the free will to choose to 
speak or not to speak to police; however, the reception of a statement must be guaranteed to be 
fair and must honor the administration of justice (R v Singh, 2007, p. 425). Any minor doubt in 
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the accused’s free will in violation to the confession rule is sufficient to exclude the confession 
(R v Singh, 2007, p. 427-428). Any action, by the authorities, that unfairly influences the 
accused’s decision to speak to authorities is an infringement of this right (R v Singh, 2007, p. 
440). The judge ruled that the statements made were voluntary and did not violate the confession 
rule (R v Singh, 2007, p. 444). However, the insistency of the police officer to continue 
interrogating after the eighteen assertions to silence, overborne his choice of whether to speak to 
authorities, and constitutes an infringement of the right to silence (R v Singh, 2007, p. 445). 
Other participating components of the principle against self-incrimination includes s. 13 the right 
to use immunity, s. 11(c) the right to non-compellability, and s. 10(b) the right to counsel (R v 
Singh, 2007, p. 418). 
R v Sinclair – The Right to Counsel  
Sinclair was arrested for murder (Dufraimont, 2011, p. 316). He was informed of his right 
to counsel and spoke with a lawyer of his choice, twice, via telephone (R v Sinclair, 2010, p. 
310). He was subsequently interviewed by police for five hours (Dufraimont, 2011, p. 316). 
Sinclair stated several times that he had nothing to say on the matter and asked to speak with his 
lawyer once more (R v Sinclair, 2010, p. 310). The officer acknowledged Sinclair’s right to 
silence yet declined his request to consult with his lawyer (R v Sinclair, 2010, p. 310-311). Over 
the course of the interview, Sinclair requested to speak to his lawyer and/or to have him present 
six more times (R v Sinclair, 2010, p. 396). The officer declined, and Sinclair was informed that 
his lawyer could not be present during questioning (R v Sinclair, 2010, p. 311). In time, police 
successfully persuaded Sinclair that they had enough evidence to convict him (Dufraimont, 2011, 
p. 316). The officer falsely claimed that they had DNA evidence linking him to the murder 
(Dufraimont, 2011, p. 316). Eventually, Sinclair made incriminating statements (R v Sinclair, 
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2010, p. 311). He was later placed in a holding cell where he was accompanied by an undercover 
officer, to whom he further incriminated himself (R v Sinclair, 2010, p. 311). He later re-enacted 
the murder, with police, at the scene of the crime (R v Sinclair, 2010, p. 311). The trial judge, 
and appeal court deemed the statements voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt and Sinclair was 
convicted (R v Sinclair, 2010, p. 311).  
The previous courts determined that s.10(b) is twofold (R v Sinclair, 2010, p. 311). It 
grants detainees access to legal advice on their current case through which police officers must 
first inform them of this right, and second, provide them with the necessary channels to do so (R 
v Sinclair, 2010, p. 311). The Court of Appeal ruled that s.10(b) can only guarantee additional 
consult with counsel if developments in the investigation illustrate a need (Dufraimont, 2011, p. 
316). These objective developments include, but are not limited to changes in the accused’s 
potential consequences, engaging a suspect in a lineup, or if the initial counsel information was 
faulty or unclear to the accused (R v Singh, 2010, p. 312; Dufraimont, 2011, p. 317).  
The Supreme Court of Canada disapproved of the Court of Appeal’s conditions and later 
established that a guarantee of access to counsel means more than once (R v Singh, 2010, p. 397). 
Notably, when the detainee is being interrogated by a skilled interviewer (R v Singh, 2010, p. 
397). The police deliberately withholding Sinclair’s access to counsel despite his constant 
requests consisted an infringement of his s.10(b) of the Charter access to counsel (R v Sinclair, 
2010, p. 397). Since Sinclair’s original statements were directly linked to the statements made to 
the undercover officer and during the re-enactment, they were excluded because they constituted 
an infringement of section 10(b) (R v Sinclair, 2010, p. 398).  
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R v Hart (2014) – The Landmark Case 
In 2002, Nelson Hart was suspected of having drowned his two three-year-old twins, 
Karen and Krista (R v Hart, 2014, p. 545). When questioned by the police, Hart claimed that 
Krista had fallen into the lake; unable to swim, he left, leaving Karen behind (Murphy & 
Anderson, 2016, p. 30). He claimed to have driven eleven kilometers to find his wife for help 
(Murphy & Anderson, 2016, p. 30; R v Hart, 2014, p. 560-561). Police, confused as to why he 
failed to make a call or stop at a nearby restaurant for help, were convinced of his guilt (R v Hart, 
2014, p. 561). Two weeks later, Hart contacted police to change his story (R v Hart, 2014, p. 
561). He alleged to have had an epileptic seizure, a detail he omitted for fear of losing his 
driver’s license (Murphy & Anderson, 2016, p. 30). 
In December of 2004, Hart was subjected to a Mr. Big operation as the police lacked 
sufficient evidence to take him into custody (R v Hart, 2014, p. 545 & 562). Police observed his 
routines, and he was gradually recruited into a fictitious syndicate (Murphy & Anderson, 2016, 
p. 31). Hart, an unemployed, intermittently homeless, lonely individual, was paid several 
thousand dollars by undercover officers posing as a criminal organization to complete simple 
tasks (Moore, 2019, p. 7; R v Hart, 2014, p. 545; Murphy & Anderson, 2016, p. 30). During this 
time, Hart was treated to fine dining, to nights out to the casino, and to trips across Canada (R v 
Hart, 2014, p. 545; Murphy & Anderson, 2016, p. 31). Hart would state that the undercover 
officers were his best friends, whom he would eventually refer to as his brothers (R v Hart, 2014, 
p. 545). Hart would frequently tell Jim, the primary undercover operative, that he loved him (R v 
Hart, 2014, p. 563). His relationship with these men had lifted him out of poverty (Moore, 2019, 
p. 8). Unexpectedly, Hart disclosed to Jim that he had drowned his twin daughters (R v Hart, 
2014, p. 545).   
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Hart was offered a position in the criminal organization for which he first had to be job-
interviewed by Mr. Big (R v Hart, 2014, p. 545). If Hart’s interview with Mr. Big was 
successful, Hart would be paid $20,000 to $25,000 for his next job (R v Hart, 2014, p. 563) He 
was subsequently shown $175,000 in cash (R v Hart, 2014, p. 563-564). Later, Jim informed 
Hart that there was a problem with his track record for which Mr. Big would need to speak to 
him (R v Hart, 2014, p. 545).  
Hart was questioned by Mr. Big about the death of his daughters; to which he denied 
responsibility (R v Hart, 2014, p. 545). When asked why he had murdered his daughters, Hart 
insisted it was an accident and clarified that he had had a seizure (Moore, 2019, p. 8; R v Hart, 
2014, p. 564). Mr. Big, accusing Hart of dishonesty, persuaded Hart into confessing to killing his 
daughters out of fear that they would be placed in the custody of his brother (Moore, 2019, p. 8; 
R v Hart, 2014, p. 564). Once Hart admitted to motive-driven culpability, he was brought to the 
location where he described to an undercover officer how he had pushed his daughters into the 
water with his knee (R v Hart, 2014, p. 545 & 565). The details did not mirror his admission to 
Mr. Big (Moore, 2019, p. 8). Hart told Mr. Big that he had “struck his daughters with his 
shoulder” (R v Hart, 2014, p. 564). Hart’s confessions were taken into evidence and he was 
charged and convicted of two counts of first-degree murder (Holmgren, 2017, p. 149; Moore, 
2019, p. 8; R v Hart, 2014, p. 565). Once detained, Hart was permitted to make a phone call; he 
called Jim (R v Hart, 2014, p. 565). 
New Common Law Rule of Evidence 
Hart’s case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada on the basis that his 
confessions constituted an infringement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
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specifically, the right to silence (R v Hart, 2014, p. 569-570; Moore, 2019, p. 9). The Supreme 
Court of Canada expressed three concerns associated with Mr. Big operations:  
(1) The risk of false confessions (R v Hart, 2014, p. 574-575).  
(2) The prejudicial effects of Mr. Big confessions; exposing a jury to an admission of 
guilt, followed by information that the accused wanted to join a criminal organization and 
participated in pseudo-crimes runs a risk of creating prejudice (R v Hart, 2014, p. 576). The trier 
of fact (Judge or a jury) may engage in “moral prejudice” or “propensity reasoning” by wrongly 
assuming the accused is guilty because of his or her willingness to participate in the criminal 
organization; or, “reasoning prejudice” which would serve to distract the judge or jury from the 
crime in question and falsely focus their attention on the moral character of the accused taken out 
of context (Holmgren, 2017, p. 156; R v Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 8; R v Hart, 2014, p. 576). 
(3) Police misconduct; violence and threatening behavior are a prevalent themes 
throughout these operations which risks generating excessive unethical police behavior (R v 
Hart, 2014, p. 578).  
Two-pronged test.  The Supreme Court of Canada in R v Hart determined there were not 
enough legal protections available to those subjected to Mr. Big operations and created a new 
common law rule of evidence required for Mr. Big cases (Murphy & Anderson, 2016, p. 30).   
 This common law rule called for a two-pronged test to determine the admissibility of 
confessions elicited through Mr. Big investigations (Parent & Parent, 2018, p. 82). The first 
prong renders any confession obtained via Mr. Big operations inadmissible unless the Crown can 
prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the prejudicial effects of the confession have been 
prevailed by its value (R v Hart, 2014, p. 580; Murphy & Anderson, 2016, p. 46). Determining 
the value of the confession serves to assess its reliability (R v Hart, 2014, p. 580). To do so, the 
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF MR. BIG OPERATIONS 29 
court must engage in an extensive cost-benefit analysis, evaluating the threshold of reliability of 
a statement to determine its trustworthiness (R v Hart, 2014, p. 583-585). The court may inspect 
the relationship between the officer and the accused, the presence of any threats, maturity levels, 
and mental health of the suspect (R v Hart, 2014, p. 585).  
Prejudicial effects are evidence that portray the accused as an immoral individual yet 
must be included to place the confession into context (R v Ledesma, 2017, p. 6). When 
determining the prejudicial effects of a confession, the court should consider whether the accused 
was involved in any simulated acts of violence, as this may increase the prejudicial effects (R v 
Magoon, 2015, p. 8). Addressing the prejudicial effects of evidence is further clarified in R v 
Mack, 2014.  
 The second prong serves to identify any abuse of process (R v Hart, 2014, p. 580-581). 
According to the current doctrine, the onus is on the accused to demonstrate that an abuse of 
process has occurred (R v Hart, 2014, p. 589). An abuse of process could occur if the confession 
is coerced, threats of violence are instilled, there are awards of monetary gains, and if the 
investigation preys on one’s substance addiction, mental health, level of intellect, or young age 
(R v Hart, 2014, p. 581 & 590 & 628; Connors et al., 2017). This list in not an exhaustive one (R 
v Hart, 2014, p. 591). The conduct of the officers must be scrutinized to determine whether 
police disproportionately manipulated the suspect (R v Hart, 2014, p. 620).  
Additionally, the principle against self-incrimination may be applied, not to determine the 
reliability of the confession, but to protect one from the way it was elicited (R v Hart, 2014, p. 
619). To determine if this principle was violated, courts must diligently analyze any coercion, the 
reliability based on incentives, and abuse of power (R v Hart, 2014, p. 628).  
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New Common Law Rule Application to R v Hart 
The addition of the new common law rules created in the R v Hart case, prompted the 
court to first analyze the probative value of Hart’s confessions (R v Hart, 2014, p. 596). Hart’s 
initial lonely, impoverished state generated doubt on the reliability of his confession made to his 
newfound friends and employers (R v Hart, 2014, p. 596). The doubt coupled with the 
inconsistency of his confessions failed the test of reliability and were deemed inadmissible (R v 
Hart, 2014, p. 598).  
Given that the first test failed, the test for abuse of process was not required; however, 
that did not prevent the Supreme Court from acknowledging that preying on Hart’s mental 
health, poverty, and social isolation constituted an abuse of process (R v Hart, 2014, p. 600-601). 
For instance, the operation continued despite awareness of Hart’s severe disposition to seizures 
(R v Hart, 2014, p. 600-601). Taking advantage of Hart’s vulnerabilities in combination with the 
sophisticated manipulation of this particular operation was deemed an infringement of Hart’s s.7 
right to life, liberty, and security of the person, as Hart’s autonomy was violated (R v Hart, 2014, 
p. 630). The admission of Hart’s statements was thus deemed unconstitutional (R v Hart, 2014, 
p. 631).   
R v Mack (2014) 
Dax Richard Mack’s roommate was reported missing and a Mr. Big operation was 
initiated (R v Mack, 2014, p. 3). Throughout the Mr. Big operation, Mack eventually confessed, 
twice, to shooting the victim and later burning his body (R v Mack, 2014, p. 3). The police later 
identified the victims bone fragments in a firepit (R v Mack, 2014, p. 3). Mack was charged and 
convicted of first-degree murder (R v Mack, 2014, p. 3).  
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In R v Mack, as opposed to in the R v Hart case, the court found that the Crown had met 
its onus and demonstrated that the threshold of reliability of the Mr. Big confession outweighed 
its prejudicial effects (R v Kelly, 2017, para. 50). Although R v Hart and R v Mack were tried on 
the same day, the R v Mack decision was released roughly two months after the R v Hart 
decision (R v Kelly, 2017, para. 50). The R v Mack case established that the jury must be clearly 
and strictly instructed on the risks of prejudice and of reliability issues associated with Mr. Big 
cases (R v Kelly, 2017, para. 51). Since there is no script nor perfect way to instruct the jury, the 
steps taken to instruct are up to interpretation and will vary from case to case (R v Kelly, 2017, 
para. 51). However, the jury must be informed that they are to decide on the reliability of the 
confession (R v Kelly, 2017, para. 51). Then, they must be informed of the circumstances under 
which the Mr. Big confession(s) was made (R v Mack, 2014, p. 27; R v Kelly, 2017, para. 52). 
Afterwards, to determine the reliability of the confession, the jury must be told to 
consider the following factors: the degree of detail, any additional evidence, components of the 
crime that were not public, and details that only a perpetrator would know (R v Kelly, 2017, para. 
53; R v Hart, 2014, para. 105). The jury must be reminded that the context of the admission in 
the confession alone does not substantiate guilt, and that any criminal activity committed by the 
accused during the sting operation was fabricated and should thus be disregarded (R v Kelly, 
2017, para. 55).  
Post-R v Hart Appeal 
R v MM (2012) Youth Case – Wrongly but not Wrongfully Convicted 
Note: To protect the identity of the underage accused, every individual named in this case has 
been provided with an alias. 
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 In 2007, the victim identified as “Dave” was shot and killed through the basement 
window of his home while hosting a house party (R v MM, 2012, p. 2). “Kevin,” who drove the 
underaged accused “Tom,” “Carl,” and another individual to the deceased’s home, initially 
informed the police that shortly after Tom and Carl exited his vehicle, he heard a gunshot, and 
upon returning to the vehicle, Tom had pointed a gun to his head, ordering him to drive (R v MM, 
2012, p. 3). Kevin also told the police that Tom had later admitted to shooting Dave (R v MM, 
2012, p. 3). However, in court, Kevin subsequently testified that Tom had not pointed a gun to 
his head, nor had he admitted to shooting Dave (R v MM, 2012, p. 17). Shortly after the shooting, 
“Hunter” called Tom to purchase crack-cocaine—a regular occurrence (R v MM, 2012, p. 24). 
Hunter informed police that Tom, Carl, and another unknown male had visited his home, and 
that Tom had removed a gun from his bag (R v MM, 2012, p. 24). The police were satisfied that 
Tom and Carl were responsible for this crime and the matter was turned over to Calgary’s 
Priority Crimes Unit and a Mr. Big sting titled “Operation Malibu” was launched on Tom (R v 
MM, 2012, p. 3 & 24). 
The police intentionally did not reveal details to the public that only a perpetrator would 
know (hold-back evidence) (R v MM, 2012, p. 26). Undercover officers observed that Tom 
frequently trained in Mixed Martial Arts (MMA) (R v MM, 2012, p. 26). His first encounter with 
an undercover operative would be through this activity (R v MM, 2012, p. 26). “Brad,” an 
undercover operative started to regularly train at the same gym as Tom (R v MM, 2012, p. 27). 
Tom eventually became close with Brad, whose alias was a wealthy security guard (R v MM, 
2012, p. 27-28). Tom, father of two young children, asked Brad for a job (R v MM, 2012, p. 28). 
Brad handed him a fake business card and later hired him as a bodyguard (R v MM, 2012, p. 28). 
Tom was flown across Canada to work for various strip clubs (R v MM, 2015, p. 5).   
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The officers had planned to have Brad be pulled over by police on warrants, with Tom 
present, to gradually expose Tom to Brad’s secret criminal livelihood (R v MM, 2012, p. 28). 
Once pulled over, Brad, ensuring Tom was watching, pulled a gun out of his jacket and hid it 
under the car seat before the police arrived to the window (R v MM, 2012, p. 28). Brad later 
informed Tom that there was an illicit and much more lucrative side to his security company, and 
offered Tom an in (R v MM, 2015, p. 2; R v MM, 2012, p. 28).  
Over the course of nine months, Tom was exposed to several falsified bloody beatings, a 
sex worker ring, kidnappings, and deaths (R v MM, 2012, p. 26-30; R v MM, 2015, p. 5). He was 
also introduced to an undercover officer who specialized in “mortgage fraud” (R v MM, 2015, p. 
5). Officers were paying Tom $1,000 cash per week and believed they had convinced him that 
their relationship had become one of genuine friendship (R v MM, 2012, p. 29). Tom became 
more open about his drug trafficking business (R v MM, 2012, p. 30). One day, Tom told Brad 
that his friend Carl had spent time in youth jail for shooting someone (R v MM, 2012, p. 28). 
Brad, in an attempt to unnerve Tom, and hopefully get him to talk, mentioned that one of 
his “contacts” had information that the police were investigating him for the murder of Dave (R v 
MM, 2012, p. 31). Tom, duly frightened, stated that he had “taken care of a guy” who had 
stabbed his friend (R v MM, 2012, p. 32). Tom later confessed that Carl had been stabbed, and so 
“… I shot him in the head” (R v MM, 2012, p. 32). During Tom’s meeting with Mr. Big, $80,000 
cash was placed on the table as an incentive to confess (R v MM, 2012, p. 34). Tom then 
divulged some of the hold-back evidence such as the type of gun, and was subsequently arrested 
(R v MM, 2012, p. 32). During Tom’s cross-examination, he stated that Carl had shot the gun (R 
v MM, 2012, p. 38).  
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF MR. BIG OPERATIONS 34 
An RCMP officer later testified that he had received information from two sources that 
Carl had shot Dave (R v MM, 2012, p. 40). Carl had since fled to Venezuela (R v MM, 2012, p. 
4). When asked to return to Canada for the trial, Carl, a Canadian, refused to ever set foot in 
Canada again (R v MM, 2012, p. 5). A Calgary police officer with the Forensic Crime Scenes 
Unit, identified two clear sets of footprints walking towards, then leaving Dave’s family home 
window from which he was shot (R v MM, 2012, p. 8-9). Dave had gang ties and had previously 
stabbed Carl in the chest for which he served time in a youth facility (R v MM, 2012, p. 7, 18 & 
47). Carl had threatened Dave because of this (R v MM, 2012, p. 14) Two party attendees 
mentioned that Carl harbored drug-trafficking related animosity towards Dave (R v MM, 2012, p. 
11 & 14). Tom had never known the deceased personally, and had only previously heard his 
name through his friend Carl (R v MM, 2012, p. 42). The police were aware that Carl had 
indisputable motives to kill Dave and that Tom did not; however, Kevin and Hunter’s statements 
prompted the launch of the Mr. Big operation on Tom and not Carl (R v MM, 2012, p. 25).  
Tom’s testimony confirmed that Kevin had driven Carl, the unknown male, and himself 
to Dave’s home where Carl and he then exited the vehicle (R v MM, 2012, p. 42). He testified 
that they had initially planned to beat Dave up, but because the open window provided a perfect 
view of Dave, Carl shot the gun through the window (R v MM, 2012, p. 42). Tom also testified 
that when he told the undercover officers that he had shot Dave, he was lying (R v MM, 2012, p. 
44). He shamefully admitted that he had lied to guarantee his position in the “criminal 
organization,” and since the undercover officers had informed him that they had resources (fake 
passports, etc.) that could free him of any possible responsibility, he believed that refraining to 
confess to shooting the gun would deprive him of these resources (R v MM, 2015, p. 21; R v MM, 
2012, p. 44-46). Tom also said that he told them he shot Dave in the head because they were 
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“bosses” and he wanted to impress them (R v MM, 2012, p. 45). The undercover officer bribed 
Tom, with money and protection, into confessing (R v MM, 2012, p. 34). Tom did however admit 
to drug-trafficking to provide a life for his two young children (R v MM, 2012, p. 45). He also 
stated that he sincerely thought Brad was a good friend (R v MM, 2012, p. 45). Tom affirmed that 
he had no antipathy towards Dave and that he had simply accompanied his friend, Carl, to 
support him (R v MM, 2012, p. 46). Tom also stated that he had spoken to Carl on the phone 
from custody several times, and Carl was confused as to why Tom was being blamed for 
shooting the gun, emphasizing that he cannot be apprehended from Venezuela, which is why he 
had fled (R v MM, 2012, p. 47-48).   
 The trial judge later emphasized the confession and the hold-back evidence (R v MM, 
2012, p. 52-55). He also stated that Tom’s defense did not create reasonable doubt, and that 
despite the inconsistencies in Kevin and Hunter’s statements, they had been “believable” (R v 
MM, 2012, p. 55). Tom had made several statements during the Mr. Big operation that implied 
he knew how to dispose of evidence (R v MM, 2012, p. 58). The plausibility that Tom might 
have offered to dispose of the gun, which would explain both the police tips and the comments 
Tom had made to officers about melting the gun, was not contemplated (R v MM, 2012, p. 24 & 
58). The judge concluded that he was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused, 
Tom, had fired the gun (R v MM, 2012, p. 59). Tom and Carl’s plan to beat Dave up deemed it 
pre-meditated, and he was convicted of first-degree murder (R v MM, 2012, p. 60 & 64). Tom 
was a youth at the time of the murder and was charged under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (R v 
MM, 2012, p. 65).  
R v MM (2015).  A new trial was ordered following the R v Hart decision (R v MM, 
2015, p. 2). Since the operation occurred pre-R v Hart, Tom requested the police disclosure of 
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Operation Malibu to properly analyze whether the conditions under which his statements were 
made affected the reliability of his confession, and whether Operation Malibu amounted to an 
abuse of process (R v MM, 2015, p. 2-3). His request for disclosure was denied (R v MM, 2016, 
p. 20).   
R v MM (2015) Appeal – New Evidence 
 In October of 2015, Carl’s girlfriend informed police in a detailed interview that Carl had 
told her that he had shot the gun and that Tom had not (R v MM, 2015, p. 14). She stated that 
during a road-trip with Carl, she persistently questioned Carl about the shooting of Dave until, 
finally, Carl broke down crying and admitted that he had shot Dave and felt awful that Tom had 
been held responsible for pulling the trigger (R v MM, 2015, p. 27-28). 
The Application of R v Hart 
Analysis.  Operation Malibu lasted eight months, Tom was involved in 65 scenarios, and 
met 25 different officers with varying, complex roles (R v MM, 2015, p. 15). Tom was in direct 
contact with Brad (the lead undercover officer) for 327 hours (R v MM, 2015, p. 15). This was 
considered an extensive and lengthy operation (R v MM, 2015, p. 16).  
Nature of the relationship between Tom and the undercover operatives.  Brad agreed 
that he and Tom had a very close friendship (R v MM, 2015, p. 16). The two exercised, trained in 
MMA, socialized, and completed assignments together (R v MM, 2015, p. 16). They grew close 
and shared personal information about their childhood with each other (R v MM, 2015, p. 16). 
Tom introduced Brad to both Carl and his father, important figures in his life (R v MM, 2015, p. 
16). The accused trusted the operative with very personal information, and frequently looked to 
him for guidance (R v MM, 2015, p. 16). However, in comparison to the Hart case, and the level 
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of dependency Hart had on the officers, Tom’s case is deemed significantly less dependent, who, 
as opposed to Hart, had other meaningful relationships in his life (R v MM 2015, p. 17).  
Extent of the inducements.  Tom was paid $150 plus tips per “legitimate” security job, 
which drastically increased when his tasks became “unlawful” (R v MM, 2015, p. 17). Tom—a 
cocaine dealer—did not appear to be in any significant financial distress (R v MM, 2015, p. 17). 
He was exposed to $40,000, $50,000, and $100,000 cash on separate occasions (R v MM, 2015, 
p. 17). Brad was painted to live in an expensive condo and drive a glamourous vehicle, a lifestyle 
that was portrayed to be available to Tom if he complied (R v MM, 2015, p. 17-18). Tom was 
informed that the organization had once made $70 million from mortgage fraud (R v MM, 2015, 
p. 17-18). He was treated to trips, hotels, and tickets to an Ultimate Fighting Championship 
(UFC) (R v MM, 2015, p. 18). It was highlighted that Tom’s need for financial assistance was 
deemed significantly less than Hart’s (R v MM, 2015, p. 18). 
Threats and violence.  Brad physically assaulted someone who had failed to properly 
complete a favor (R v MM, 2015, p. 18). A janitor who had seen something he should not have 
was offered “hush-money,” kidnapped, beaten, and later “died” of his injuries (R v MM, 2015, p. 
18-19). Tom was included in conversations discussing killing someone (R v MM, 2015, p. 19). 
This case differed from Hart’s in that Hart was made clearly aware that members within the 
organization who betrayed the trust of the organization were violently punished (R v MM, 2015, 
p. 19). This was considered inequivalent as, in Tom’s case, only members outside of the 
organization were threatened or assaulted (R v MM, 2015, p. 19).   
 Mr. Big’s conduct.  The recorded Mr. Big interrogation was held by both Brad and 
“John,” Brad’s “boss,” of whom Brad had spoken very highly of (R v MM, 2015, p. 20). John 
and the undercover operative who had acquired the information that Tom was a suspect were 
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perceived as having powerful resources to legally help Tom and/or to help him escape retribution 
(R v MM, 2015, p. 19-20). The meeting did not appear to be very forceful (R v MM, 2015, p. 20). 
Tom willingly stated his part in the murder of Dave (R v MM, 2015, p. 20). His confession 
differed from that of a conspicuously coercive one, as it did not begin with denial of involvement 
that eventually resulted in a confession (R v MM, 2015, p. 20-21). John did however state that 
Tom’s involvement in this murder was drawing unwanted attention to the organization (R v MM, 
2015, p. 21). Tom’s Mr. Big interview significantly differed from Hart’s, as Hart was directly 
accused of killing his daughters (R v MM, 2015, p. 21).  
 The accused.  At the time of the murder, Tom was 17 years old (R v MM, 2015, p. 21). 
Throughout Operation Malibu, Tom was 19 and 20 years old (R v MM, 2015, p. 21). The court 
acknowledged that confessions made by youth are at a greater risk of unreliability and should be 
given special consideration (R v MM, 2015, p. 14 & 22). Although Tom was young, he was 
deemed mature for his age as he had two children whom he actively cared for, with two different 
women with whom he maintained a civil relationship (R v MM, 2015, p. 22). Mental health or 
addiction did not factor in (R v MM, 2015, p. 22). Tom seemed adequately competent to run a 
relatively successful drug trafficking business (R v MM, 2015, p. 22). The accused had multiple 
close friends and appeared to have a meaningful relationship with his family (R v MM, 2015, p. 
22). As opposed to Hart who had no valuable relationships other than the undercover officers, 
had a deteriorating mental health, and a grade five education (R v MM, 2015, p. 22-23).   
 The accused did not appear to be taken aback by any violence that occurred throughout 
the operation as he had been exposed to severe violence throughout the course of his young life 
and had general knowledge about crime and ridding of evidence (R v MM, 2015, p. 23). This was 
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used against him. Although the accused was young, his insight into the world of crime, due to his 
background, increased his level of sophistication according to this court (R v MM, 2015, p. 23).  
 Although young age is presumed to be a risk factor, Tom’s maturity level allegedly 
surpassed that of an adult and was thus disregarded (R v MM, 2015, p. 24). Tom’s unconcerned 
composure with regards to violence deemed the falsified assaults as noncoercive (R v MM, 2015, 
p. 24). His willingness to confess and non-requirement for the operatives to forcefully elicit a 
confession also lowered the perceived coerciveness of the operation (R v MM, 2015, p. 24).  
Confirmatory evidence.  The accused provided a detailed confession which 
corresponded with what the investigators knew, including the type of gun, what he wore, and 
how Dave was killed (R v MM, 2015, p. 25-26). Note that some of this information was available 
through the media (R v MM, 2015, p. 27). His confession did not lead to the discovery of 
additional evidence (R v MM, 2015, p. 27). Throughout his confession, Tom appeared very 
confident that police would not have any DNA evidence linking him to the shooting (R v MM, 
2015, p. 27). Despite the new evidence that Carl’s girlfriend provided about Carl identifying 
himself as the shooter to her, Tom’s confession was deemed reliable ratifying its probative value 
(R v MM, 2015, p. 29).  
Measuring prejudicial effects.  Do the prejudicial effects outweigh its probative value? 
Throughout the operation, the accused was involved in pseudo assaults, break and enters, 
robbery, domestic violence, drug offences, and sexist and racist conversations with the 
undercover officers (R v MM, 2015, p. 29). Particularly, he was involved in the kidnapping of, 
and conversation of killing, a janitor (R v MM, 2015, p. 29). The confession cannot be admitted 
into evidence without including the aforementioned details, to provide a jury with context under 
which the confession was made. The defense argued that including these details would render a 
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jury prejudiced about the accused’s moral character, which may render an explanation as to why 
his confession was a lie unbelievable to an unsuspecting judge (R v MM, 2015, p. 31-32). The 
Crown, however, argued that the value and accuracy of the confession outweighed these 
prejudicial effects (R v MM, 2015, p. 32). This court favored the Crown’s argument (R v MM, 
2015, p. 32).    
Abuse of process.  It was concluded that the operation did not prey on Tom’s young age, 
mental health, or substance addiction (R v MM, 2015, p. 33). Despite the fact that the level of 
violence included in this operation was classified as high, the violence was not directed towards 
the accused and did not amount to an abuse of process (R v MM, 2015, p. 33). Therefore, Tom’s 
confession was deemed admissible (R v MM, 2015, p. 37).  
Post-R v Hart Mr. Big Operation – R v Buckley (2018) 
Note: a publication ban has been instilled on the identity of the undercover officers and they 
have each been assigned an alias. 
In October of 2015 Operation Hackman was launched on John Buckley, who was 
eighteen years-old when his mother, Victoria Rae Brauns-Buckley, was found killed in her 
family home (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 2). Police gathered almost 1000 hours of audio recordings 
and involved Buckley in 77 incidents (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 2). Over time, police observed that 
Buckley lived in Montreal, was collecting welfare cheques, worked at a coffee shop, had a 
girlfriend, had a small social circle, and did not appear to have any hobbies (R v Buckley, 2018, 
p. 4-5). Attempts to befriend Buckley were unsuccessful (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 5). Undercover 
operatives, therefore, approached him and offered him a job at $20 per hour (R v Buckley, 2018, 
p. 5). This organization treated him lavishly (R v Buckley, 2018, p.5). He was frequently flown 
across Canada with paid restaurant and hotel accommodations (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 5). He 
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would be invited to open-bar events hosted by the organization, where he would meet various 
members of the company, such as Vice Presidents and even Mr. Big (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 5).  
Buckley would become close to “Mark” his direct supervisor (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 5-6). 
The organization would frequently refer to themselves as a family (R v Bukley, 2018, p. 6). All 
members of the organization were painted as living upscale lifestyles with early retirement 
options, recreational vehicles, and vacation homes (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 6). The organization 
took him to National Hockey League (NHL) games, helped him pay his rent, bought him various 
items, such as an NHL Jersey (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 10). Buckley was made directly aware that 
the organization was involved in non-violent crime such as illegal gold transactions and 
insurance fraud (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 6). However, Buckley would gradually learn that the 
organization had ties to the Italian Mafia and “bikers” (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 6). To instill fear, 
officers would often imply that they had previously engaged in violent acts (R v Buckley, 2018, 
p. 6).  
Buckley was involved in several simulated crimes such as: blackmailing a police officer 
who they had caught on camera having sex with a sex worker, creating a false alibi to police for 
another member of the organization, forging hospital records, smuggling cell-phones into jail for 
a biker (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 7 & 9).  
Throughout this operation, Buckley was described as extremely grateful for his new 
friendships, and would frequently break down emotionally (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 10). Buckley 
was thoroughly informed that if he wanted, he was free to leave the organization, and that lying 
would result in dismissal, and that no additional repercussions would be suffered (R v Buckley, 
2018, p. 12) 
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Dylan, one of the organization’s Vice Presidents, would eventually inform Buckley that 
his background check tied him to his mother’s death and that he received information that 
Buckley’s arrest was imminent; Buckley cried (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 10 &12). He said that if he 
went to prison, he would kill himself (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 12). Dylan informed Buckley that if 
he confessed, in detail, he would have a biker, who owed him a favor and who was serving a life 
sentence, falsely confess on his behalf (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 12). Buckley’s professed innocence 
was to no avail, Dylan insisted on needing every detail for the biker’s confession to be accurate 
(R v Buckley, 2018, p. 12). To persuade Buckley to confess, Dylan implied that he had murdered 
someone before (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 13).  
Buckley’s options were displayed as follows: If Buckley did not confess, he would be 
fired, and charged with his mother’s murder (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 12). If he did confess, he 
would not be sent to prison, could continue to work for the organization, and would collect his 
mother’s insurance money (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 12-13).  
Buckley said he found his mother’s body, and was afraid that he would be pinned to the 
murder, so omitted calling the police within a reasonable time (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 14). Dylan, 
implying that without the organization’s help, Buckley would be pinned to the murder anyhow, 
managed to convince Buckley into saying “I did it” (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 15). Buckley said he 
killed his mother with a hammer (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 15). Note that Buckley had previously 
been given disclosure of various case details including that his mother had been killed by blunt 
force trauma to the head, resembling what is typically caused by a hammer (R v Buckley, 2018, 
p. 16 & 22). There was no hold-back evidence that only the murderer would know (R v Buckley, 
2018, p. 21). Buckley’s answers about what he did with his clothes, the shoes he was wearing, 
and the type of hammer he used were inconsistent (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 16-18). The hammer 
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was not found where he said he placed it (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 22). He said he struck his mother 
a maximum of three times; while forensics suggested it was at least eight times (R v Buckley, 
2018, p. 22).  
Application of R v Hart 
To comply with R v Hart, the Mr. Big operation Hackman deliberately used less physical 
violence and instilled less fear of imminent danger to the suspect (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 24). All 
“scenarios” were also audio recorded (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 24). As there was no abuse of 
process, this case solely relied on the first prong devised from R v Hart (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 
27) Thus, the onus was on the Crown to prove that the probative value of the confession 
outweighed its prejudicial effects (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 26). To determine the reliability, the 
circumstances of the operation to consider, as outlined in R v Hart, were analyzed: the operation 
lasted six months; he participated in 77 scenarios; he spent approximately 700 hours with Mark; 
he was exposed to excessive amounts of cash and glamour; refusing to confess was not 
associated with physical retribution; the Mr. Big interrogation was not overly oppressive; 
Buckley did not appear to have any prominent mental health problems; and he was in his early 
twenties at the time of the operation (R v Hart, 2014, p. 585-586; R v Buckley, 2018, p. 27-30). 
 Next, the court must seek reliability indicators within the confession (R v Buckley, 2018, 
p. 30). The confession was relatively detailed, did not lead to the discovery of additional 
evidence, and did not uncover any hold-back evidence (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 30-34). Hence, the 
confession was deemed unreliable and was made inadmissible because its reliability did not 
outweigh its prejudicial effects (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 35-37).  
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PART TWO – Critical Analyses of Mr. Big Operations 
Section 25 of the Canadian Criminal Code provides legal protection for law enforcement 
to engage in deceptive behavior to solve serious crime. This section condones police lies, tricks, 
and undercover work when police are dealing with sophisticated criminals (Parent & Parent, 
2018, p. 79). 
Case Law Precedents 
R v Campeau (2016) & R v Worme (2016) – admissibility of third party evidence.  
Allegedly, Sheldon Worme invited Derek Campeau, and Aaron Stevens to Daniel Levesque 
house, where the three proceeded to rob, then torture Levesque to death while demanding his 
bank PIN (R v Campeau, 2016, p. 1). Campeau and Stevens later stabbed Worme nearly causing 
his death (R v Campeau, 2016, p. 1 & 14). A Mr. Big operation was launched on Worme (R v 
Worme, 2016, p. 1-2). His first confession excluded himself from Levesque’s murder as an 
innocent bystander; whereas his second suggested that he had caused Levesque’s death (R v 
Worme, 2016, p. 14). Worme, tried separately, was convicted of first degree murder; Campeau 
and Stevens were convicted of manslaughter (R v Worme, 2016, p. 1; R v Campeau, 2016, p. 1). 
When Campeau appealed the admissibility of Worme’s confession toward his conviction, new 
case law was created to allow the admission of third-party Mr. Big evidence that implicates a co-
accused’s actus reus of an offence, so long as it abides by the R v Khelawon necessity and 
reliability hearsay rule (R v Campeau, 2016, p. 1 & 8-9).  
R v Yakimchuk (2017) – threshold of reliability.  In 2017, the Alberta Court of Appeal 
in R v Yakimchuk established a threshold between acceptable and unacceptable interrogation 
tactics in Mr. Big operations (p. 1 & 12; R v Ledesma, 2020, p. 19). It was established that the 
event where the crime is initially brought to question by the primary undercover operative and an 
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offer is made to help make the problem disappear, is considered significantly less coercive and 
less inducive of a false confessions than when the suspect is made to prove to Mr. Big that he is 
qualified to be a member of the organization (R v Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 12; R v Ledesma, 2020, p. 
23-24).  
R v Magoon (2015) – confirmatory evidence.  Spencer Jordan and Marie-Eve Magoon 
were suspected of having caused the disturbing, gradual death of 6-year-old Meika Jordan (R v 
Magoon, 2018, p. 310). Undercover officers posing as a couple set out to befriend the two and a 
confession was elicited (R v Magoon, 2015, p. 9). When determining the probative value of the 
confession as laid out in R v Hart, R v Magoon resolved that confirmatory evidence, though not 
essential, is a strong indicator of reliability (R v Magoon, 2015, p. 7-8).  
Inapplicable protections.  Through careful wording, the Interrogation Trilogy legal 
protections available to individuals subjected to police interrogation points to the exclusion of 
Mr. Big interrogations. R v Oickle’s confession rule protects against reprehensible interrogation 
techniques that could prompt false confessions by addressing the voluntariness of a confession 
(R v Oickle, 2000, p. 5-6; R v Singh, 2007, p. 421-422). Determining the voluntariness of a 
confession is crucial because a confession is so influential that it can singlehandedly warrant a 
conviction (R v Singh, 2007, p. 422). Within the framework of the confession rule, if an 
interviewee believed that making a statement would result in favorable treatment, this would 
pose a risk to the reliability of the confession (R v Singh, 2007, p. 430). He or she may be 
inclined to provide a false statement to influence or control what course of action that person 
may take (R v Singh, 2007, p. 430-431). However, it only applies when one is speaking to a 
known person of authority (Dufraimont, 2011, p. 311; R.v Hart, 2014, p. 573). Moore (2019) 
argues that the police’s power does not diminish when they are impersonating a non-police 
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officer (p. 9). Undercover officers who take part in Mr. Big operations are highly skilled actors. 
One may argue that Mr. Big’s persona constitutes, though illegitimate, an equally dominant 
authority figure. In R v Hart’s initial appeal, the court disputed whether Hart was speaking with a 
person of authority and whether he was under “state control” when he confessed (R v Hart, 2014, 
p. 567; Moore, 2019, p. 8). This court believed he was (Moore, 2019, p. 8). 
The R v Herbert rules for the Section 7 right to silence highlights how conversations with 
undercover officers, or information obtained through mechanical devices are an infringement of 
this right (R v Hebert, 1990, p. 183). However, it only applies once the individual has been 
formally detained; thus, inapplicable to Mr. Big operations (R v Hebert, 1990, p. 184; R v Hart, 
2014, p. 573). However, psychologists argue that six to eight months of orchestrated social deceit 
can be far more controlling than formal detainment (Moore, 2019, p. 3). The lack of one being 
given the opportunity or a forewarning to exercise one’s right to counsel or right to silence does 
not determine the admissibility of a statement (R v Singh, 2007, p. 423-424). However, if one has 
not spoken to counsel nor exercised their right to silence, the voluntariness of the confession is 
required to be explored in greater detail (R v Singh, 2007, p. 424).  
Advantage of Mr. Big Operations 
The technique is a well-developed, extremely sophisticated manner of eliciting 
confessions (Holmgren, 2017, p. 155). It is an effective way of addressing murder cases that 
have gone cold (Holmgren, 2017, p. 155). These operations have successfully led investigators to 
missing evidence, such as the murder weapon or the body of the deceased (R v Hart, 2014, p. 
572; Holmgren, 2017, p. 155). Timothy Moore (2019) an expert on Mr. Big operations describes 
the tactic as “ingenious” (p. 2). The technique has clearly been a contributing factor in solving 
cases (Holmgren, 2017, p. 155). In R v Yakimchuk, following murder-related discussions with the 
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primary undercover operative, Yakimchuk disclosed to the undercover operative that he had 
previously been involved in a murder (R v Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 4). To the police’s surprise, this 
confession was not of the homicide that launched the Mr. Big operation but of a different murder 
in Saskatoon from earlier years (R v Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 4). This Mr. Big operation re-opened a 
case that had gone cold. Additionally, the confession acquired from the Mr. Big operation in the 
tragic R v Magoon child torture, murder case was vital for the prosecution to convict the two 
accused (R v Magoon, 2018, p. 320). As well, had it not been for the launch of a Mr. Big 
operation on Micheal Bridges, the body of teenage Erin Chorney would not have been found and 
she would still be considered a missing person (Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 15). 
 These operations effectively produce confessions 75 percent of the time (Holmgren, 
2017, p. 155). The RCMP states that the technique guarantees the correct individual is brought to 
justice, which they attribute to the recurring themes of trust and honesty (Keenan & Brockman, 
2010, p. 16; Holmgren, 2017, p. 155). The aura of criminality portrayed by the operation has a 
strong potential to encourage an individual to be honest about their own criminality (Holmgren, 
2017, p. 156). However, it has equal potential to induce one to lie. In an interview with Dr. Janne 
Holmgren, Kouri Keenan, author of Mr. Big – Exposing Undercover Investigations in Canada 
states that “suspects might very well be telling the truth. They might also be lying. There’s no 
way to tell” (Holmgren, 2017, p. 156).  
Potential Injustices of Mr. Big Operations 
Coercion 
In Mr. Big operations, the suspect is given an ultimatum, confess and receive a 
consequence-free ticket into a profitable organization or refuse to confess and lose every benefit 
the operatives have laid-out (R v Kelly, 2017, para. 12; R v MM, 2015, p. 24). As opposed to 
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other undercover work where officers painstakingly gather information, Mr. Big operations’ 
manner of inducing a confession is designed to obtrusively coerce (R v Hart, 2014, p. 623). R v 
Hart defines coercion as depriving a suspect of a reasonable alternative to confessing (2014, p. 
615). Examples of a coercive police tactics declared unacceptable in R v Hart include violent 
threats and threats of violence (2014, p. 590-591). However, R v Hart states that the structure of 
Mr. Big operations is in and of itself coercive, which does not automatically deem a confession 
inadmissible (R v Hart, 2014, p. 623). All aspects of the operation must be thoroughly and 
diligently scrutinized to formulate a holistic conclusion (R v Hart, 2014, p. 623).  
Entrapment  
 A widespread misconception of Mr. Big operations is that they are a form of entrapment 
(Puddister & Riddell, 2012, p. 397). R v Mack (1988), the leading precedent for the defense of 
entrapment, defines its two prongs as (a) When persons of authority have no reasonable 
suspicion that a suspect is involved in crime, and then provide a suspect with an opportunity to 
commit a crime; or (b) going beyond providing an opportunity of inducing one into committing 
an offence of whom they have reasonable suspicion (para. 3). Since the crimes that the subject of 
a Mr. Big operation is required to execute are falsified, and the suspect is not later charged with 
these offences, Mr. Big operations do not constitute entrapment (Puddister & Riddell, 2012, p. 
397). Entrapment is not a traditional defense, but it is recognized as a part of the Charter’s 
Section 7 abuse of process doctrine (R v Mack, 1988, para. 37).  
However, given the particulars of a case, this defense has been used in certain Mr. Big 
cases. For instance, in R v Ledesma, since throughout the course of the Mr. Big operation, the 
organization indirectly encouraged criminal behavior by committing a series of pseudo-crimes, 
the appellant argued that permitting Ledesma to flee an encounter with undercover officers with 
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a gun in his possession was a form of entrapment, placed the public at risk, and thus constituted 
an abuse of process (R v Ledesma, 2017, p. 5).  
Also, in R v NRR (2014), throughout the Mr. Big interview with the 16-year-old youth, 
whereby Mr. Big questioned him about a double homicide, the suspect changed the subject from 
his past criminality to stating that he was planning on murdering the husband of his 34-year-old 
girlfriend and sought advice from Mr. Big (R v NRR, 2014, p. 3). The woman worked at a youth 
center that the suspect had attended and had had an intimate relationship with the underage 
accused (R v NRR, 2014, p. 2). The goal of the operation was then modified into discovering 
whether the youth was sincere about his plan to kill her husband (R v NRR, 2014, p. 6). Mr. Big 
requested all the information the suspect had on his target and then arranged for the suspect to 
meet an undercover officer described as a “hitman” near the target’s home (R v NRR, 2014, p. 7). 
The suspect then actively counseled the hitman into the murder and provided him with all the 
information he had (R v NRR, 2014, p. 7). Counselling one to commit an indictable offence that 
is not committed is an indictable offence under section 464(a) of the Canadian Criminal Code. 
The suspect did not request a hitman, nor for the undercover officers to participate; the inclusion 
of the hitman was introduced by the undercover officers (R v NRR, 2014, p. 11). The Alberta 
Court of Appeal then concluded that on a balance of probabilities, the police had, in fact, 
entrapped the suspect (R v NRR, 2014, p. 12).  
International Mr. Big Operations 
The coercive nature of Mr. Big operations is deemed an infringement of the constitutional 
rights of people living in the United States; hence why it has been prohibited (Keenan & 
Brockman, 2010, p. 24). Police deception is only acceptable after the suspect has been read their 
Miranda Rights, which is the right to remain silent when one is being interrogated by police in 
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the United States (Holmgren, 2017, p. 62; Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 24). Undercover sting 
operations were banned in England after a Mr. Big-like undercover operation involving an 
attractive female officer tricking a suspect into speaking about his violent sexual fantasies was 
deemed the grossest kind of deception by the judge (Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 24). Though, 
the Canadian Mr. Big operation has been brought to and performed in the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, and Australia (Moore, 2019, p. 2).   
Secrecy & Costs 
The cost of individual Mr. Big operations is inconsistent, it can range from thousands to 
millions (Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 23-24). Ledesma’s case is considered inexpensive and 
cost roughly $37,000 (R v Ledesma, 2020, p. 16). Whereas, among the more expensive ones 
include the $2 million that the government spent on a three-year Mr. Big operation to find those 
responsible for the murder of four RCMP officers in Alberta in 2005, and the $4 million spent 
eliciting a confession from Salvatore Ciancio for the murder of seven separate individuals 
(Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 24). Hart’s Mr. Big operation cost Canadian taxpayers over 
$400,000 and the R v Buckley Mr. Big operation that took place after the R v Hart decision, 
exceeded $300,000 in costs (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 2; Murphy & Anderson, 2016, p. 31).  
These operations absorb a large portion of police resources, and does not even address all 
violent crimes (Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 28). Canadian tax-payers are paying an expensive 
price for an investigation they receive very little information (Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 23). 
These cases frequently have publication bans to protect the identity of undercover officers, 
thereby making the type of questions and interviewing methods used by the officers difficult to 
scrutinize (Holmgren, 2017, p. 148 & 274). C.E.S. Franks, emeritus political studies professor at 
Queen’s University, claims that “Secrecy in any government is an invitation to an abuse of 
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power” (Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 21). Yet, the cornerstone of Mr. Big operations’ very 
success is its confidential nature (Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 21).  
Lack of oversight.  The extreme secrecy associated with undercover operations makes it 
challenging to analyze, which has led to the suggestion that the entire investigation be 
documented (Moore et al., 2009, p.348; Smith et al., 2010). When researching police 
independence with regards to the Canadian Mr. Big operation, Puddister and Riddell (2012) 
concluded that the Mr. Big operation need not be abolished yet requires more police 
accountability and oversight (p. 387). Videotaping the entire investigation, and interaction would 
provide a court, and researchers with greater context that led to the confession (Smith et al., 
2010, p. 40). The Hawthorne effect is when one changes his or her behavior for fear that they are 
being observed (Schwartz, Fischhoff, Krishnamurti, Sowell, 2013, p. 15242). One may anticipate 
that implementing further Mr. Big operation oversight would positively affect these operations, 
in that officers would consciously reduce their use of potentially shocking behavior.  
 However, reviewing all recorded information about a case, may be too time-consuming 
and infringe on one’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms s.11(b) right to a speedy trial as further 
clarified in R v Jordan (2016, p. 1). This implementation was predicted to increase the already 
extensive costs associated with these investigations, which was later demonstrated in the 
relatively expensive and significantly less violent R v Buckley post-R v Hart operation that 
yielded 1000 hours of police video and audio recordings (Schleichkorn, 2013, p. 389; R v 
Buckley, 2018, p. 2).  
When determining the characteristics of the suspect that serve to render a confession 
more or less reliable—as required by R v Hart—without police oversight, the undercover 
officers’ views are used to draw conclusions about the suspect’s confession (R v MM, 2015, p. 
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22). Though the officer(s) may be genuine, the RCMP disproportionately supports the use of Mr. 
Big operations which could potentially thwart a trial (Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 16). For 
instance, when the Mr. Big officer from the R v Worme case was cross examined, he was asked 
by the defense attorney: “Would I be fair in saying that, in your experience, despite all of that 
building of truth scenarios, there have still been false confessions given to you as Mr. Big?” To 
which the officer responded: “No, there hasn’t.” (R v Worme, 2016, p. 13). This was the same 
officer that participated in Cody Bates Mr. Big investigation, a known false confession (R v 
Worme, 2016, p. 3).  
Justice for victims.  On August 8, 2014, the Winnipeg Police Service pulled over a 
drunk driver (Manitoba Advocate, 2019, p. 46). Fifteen-year-old Tina Fontaine was the 
passenger (Manitoba Advocate, 2019, p. 46). Officers let Tina go with the driver despite her 
missing person status (Manitoba Advocate, 2019, p. 46). Later that day, Tina was found in an 
alley, unconscious, and naked from the waist down (Manitoba Advocate, 2019, p. 46). She tested 
positive for methamphetamines, cocaine, alcohol, and cannabis, by paramedics (Manitoba 
Advocate, 2019, p. 46). Tina was later seen entering johns’ vehicles and would spend time with 
men known for their sexual exploitation of young girls (Manitoba Advocate, 2019, p. 49-50).  
On August 17, 2014, police found Tina’s body in a river (Manitoba Advocate, 2019, p. 
50). Her cause of death remains undetermined (Manitoba Advocate, 2019, p. 51). Tina 
Fontaine’s murder created public outrage because it sadly resembles that of so many other 
Indigenous people who have been failed by both the police and the Canadian Child Welfare 
System (Manitoba Advocate, 2019, p. 8 & 46; Navia, Henderson, & Charger, 2018, p. 146). 
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Tina’s death prompted a Mr. Big operation on Raymond Cormier (Puddister, 2018, para. 
3). In February, 2018, Cormier was found not guilty by a jury (MacLean, 2018, para. 1). As of 
March, 2019, Tina’s case remains unsolved (Lodge, para. 4).  
Puddister (2018) expresses concern for victim’s rights with regards to Mr. Big operations 
(para. 25-26). She insists that the families of victims deserve a thorough police investigation that 
explores all potential suspects (Puddister, 2018, para. 26). These controversial Mr. Big 
investigations are compromising the community’s confidence in police and the justice system 
(Puddister, 2018, para. 27). Tina was, once again, failed by a broken system. 
Tunnel Vision  
Mr. Big operations take place when there is little to no forensic evidence about a crime; 
yet, the confession acquired through the sting operation has often been the only—and deemed 
sufficient—evidence presented by police to close a case (Puddister & Riddell, 2012, p. 385-386; 
Schleichkorn, 2013, p. 392; Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 15). Police relied solely on 
informants to spark the Mr. Big operation on MM from Operation Malibu, and failed to pursue 
other suspects (R v MM, 2012, p. 56). Prior to launching the Mr. Big operation on Allgood, his 
fingerprints and DNA did not match any found at the scene (R v Allgood, 2015, p. 3). Tunnel 
vision occurs when members of the system build a case against a subject, whilst unconsciously 
undermining any contradictory evidence (FPT, 2018, p. 7). Confirmation bias is linked to tunnel 
vision as it causes individuals to prefer information that supports their conclusion (FPT, 2018, p. 
7). Hindsight bias (knew-it all-along-bias) leads individuals to trust that their believed outcome is 
inevitable (FPT, 2018, p. 7). Psychologists say that even highly intelligent people use mental 
shortcuts to make decisions (FPT, 2018, p. 8). In the R v Yakimchuk (2017) case, the confession 
was the only evidence (p. 6). Police had retrieved no murder weapon, DNA evidence, footprints, 
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nor fingerprints (R v Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 6). Police informants, an anonymous tip, or a simple 
police hunch may be enough to prompt a Mr. Big operation on the wrong individual (R v MM, 
2016, p. 25; R v Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 6).  
When alleged crimes are violent or attract media attention, police agencies are pressured 
by both the public and their colleagues to promptly solve a case, especially in cases where the 
offender is at large and poses a risk to the public (FPT, 2018, p. 10). Within police forces, the 
culture may promote competition to solve a case, which can result in a lack of properly shared 
information (FPT, 2018, p. 10). Officers should be discouraged from instantly pursuing the best 
lead (FPT, 2018, p. 10-11).    
Lucifer effect.  Introducing an individual to the gang politics of a criminal organization 
can effectively be a forerunner to committing violent acts (Bates, 2018, p. 132). Although many, 
such as Bates, Ledesma, and Yakimchuk had a history of crime, one may conceivably conclude 
that the glorification of criminal acts—the modus operandi of undercover police operatives—has 
a degenerating effect, solidifying the criminal prestige portrayed in films, thereby convincing the 
subject that violence commends respect (R v Bates, 2009, p. 5-6, R v Ledesma, 2019, p. 13; R v 
Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 6). Philip Zimbardo wrote the book “How good people turn evil” where he 
highlights how dramatic situational changes in someone life have the power to affect the 
morality and compassion of that individual (Holmgren, 2017, p. 158). These findings were the 
result of Zimbardo’s controversial Stanford Prison Experiment (Manso-Pinto, 2011, p. 135). In R 
v Hart (2014) it was mentioned that the extremely manipulative nature of these types of 
investigations can compromise the sense of freedom and the morality of the suspect (R v Hart, 
2014, p. 606). Notably in cases of impressionable youth who tend to repeat behavior they are 
exposed to (Holmgren, 2017, p. 164). 
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Mr. Big on Youth  
There is consistently strong sociological evidence that youth are much more susceptible 
to false confessions as they tend to be highly submissive, exceptionally suggestible, and, 
compared to adults, tend to comply with authority figures (Haney-Caron, Goldstein, & Mesiarik, 
2018, p. 1955; Holmgren, 2017, p. 164). Out of every exonerated youth in the United States, 
between 1985 and 2003, 44 percent had falsely confessed (Haney-Caron et al., 2018, p. 1956). 
Unger, aged 19, though not legally a youth in Canada, told reporters after being 
exonerated that he had falsely confessed to Mr. Big because he was “young, naïve, and desperate 
for money” (Grabish, 2019, para. 11). The primary undercover operative in R v MM, being ten 
years older than the suspect, stated he felt like his mentor and frequently witnessed the suspect 
mimicking him (R v MM, 2015, p. 16). The undercover operative was an adult figure that the 
suspect admired (R v MM, 2015, p. 16). Youth may be more inclined than adults to want to 
impress others. 
Was R v Hart Effective? 
1. The Probative Value of the Confession 
Suspect relationships.  In both R v MM and R v Ledesma’s application of R v Hart, it 
was highlighted that they had a relatively large social circle in contrast to Hart who would lose 
his only source of friendship if he failed to comply (R v Ledesma, 2020, p. 13; R v MM, 2015, p. 
22). This characteristic was used to deem both individuals as less attached to the undercover 
officers and reduce the perceived level of police manipulation. But can one accurately conclude 
that because one has other sources of friendship, that the level at which that person values their 
relationship with the undercover officers is, in all cases, lower than that of one who was more 
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introverted or antisocial? Also, is it not conceivable that having a larger social circle might 
increase the risk that the suspect had obtained the hold-back evidence through word of mouth?  
In R v Allgood, when determining the reliability of the confession, an officer testified that 
he felt like he was Allgood’s best friend (2015, p. 15). Ledesma and the undercover operative’s 
relationship was very close, they frequently hugged and expressed their love for one another (R v 
Ledesma, 2020, p. 15). Ledesma once kissed the officer on the cheek (R v Ledesma, 2020, p. 15). 
Maturity and level of vulnerability.  In R v Yakimchuk, R v Ledesma, R v West, and R v 
MM’s cases, their “street-smarts,” sophistication-level, and outgoing personalities were 
characterized as signs of maturity which, when applying the R v Hart rules, served to increase 
the reliability of their confessions, decrease the perceived potential coercion of the Mr. Big 
operation, and decrease any abuse of process (R v Ledesma, 2020, p. 18; R v MM, 2015, p. 22; R 
v Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 13; R v West, 2015, p. 27). In R v Yakimchuk (2017), when discussing the 
appellant’s level of intelligence, the Alberta appeal court stated, “ …there is nothing to suggest 
that [Yakimchuk] was weak or vulnerable to manipulation” (p. 13). Ledesma expressed that he 
was concerned about his addiction to drugs and alcohol, yet this did not stop officers from 
encouraging him to drink and providing him with the means to do so (R v Ledesma, 2020, p. 13). 
The court acknowledged that MM’s young age was a risk factor, though decided that his level of 
sophistication was far beyond his age (R v MM, 2015, p. 23-24). In comparison to Hart—an 
exceptional case—who had a grade five education and evident mental health issues, if one’s 
vulnerability isn’t as visible and as severe as Hart’s was, it tends to be overlooked under the R v 
Hart framework (R v MM, 2015, p. 22-23).  
Accuracy of hold-back evidence.  Although the accuracy and thus the reliability of the 
confession in “Tom’s” R v MM (2015) case was rather high as he uncovered the “hold-back 
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evidence,” the Alberta court failed to acknowledge that those specific details would be known to 
both the shooter and he who accompanied the shooter, the risk being further elevated because the 
two had a close friendship. Given this, without thoroughly and successfully eliminating “Carl” as 
a suspect, one cannot, beyond a reasonable doubt, predicate that he had pulled the trigger. A 
suggestion would be to ensure every known person that was present at the scene of the crime, 
and potential perpetrator, is thoroughly eliminated as a suspect prior to establishing that one of 
two or more known persons present is guilty. Within the R v Hart framework, the value of the 
confession does not decrease if the details that are made available to the public mirror the details 
in the suspect’s confession (R v Randle, 2016, p. 28-29; R v Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 13). 
Consistency between confessions.  Frequently, the police create an event that is intended 
to induce the discussion of the crime with the primary undercover operative (R v Yakimchuk, 
2017, p. 4). This event aims to unnerve the suspect, and often leads to the first confession (R v 
Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 4). Undercover operatives may share with a suspect a falsified police 
document illustrating that he or she is the primary suspect of a crime (Keenan & Brockman, 
2010, p. 21). For instance, in R v Worme, uniformed police officers contacted his loved ones and 
implicated him in murder, assuming this interaction would later be shared with Worme; the 
police in R v Yakimchuk released a sketch, from a fake witness, of Yakimchuk’s face, to the news 
linking him to the murder; in Ledesma’s case, the police released the video footage of him in a 
nearby Mac’s the night of the murder to the media; in R v MM, the operative received a phone 
call from one of his “contacts” informing him that MM was a suspect for murder (R v Worme, 
2016, p. 11-12; R v Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 4; R v Ledesma, 2020, p. 5; R v MM, 2012, p. 31). 
Though inapplicable to Mr. Big confessions, R v Oickle’s confession rule protects suspects who 
are presented with fabricated evidence, to cue a reaction, when interrogated by police (R v 
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Oickle, 2000, p. 5). After they have been caught off guard and confessed or discussed the crime 
in question with the primary undercover operative, the suspect is later required to confess again 
to Mr. Big—who, at the time, may be accompanied by the original undercover operative—who 
persistently reinforces the importance of honesty (R v MM, 2015, p. 20). Yakimchuk stated that 
this strict requirement for honesty motivated him, not to be honest, but to ensure that both his 
first, and second confessions were indistinguishable (R v Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 12). Which, within 
the framework of R v Hart, reinforces the reliability of the confession.  
2. Abuse of Process 
Violence.  In recent years, to reduce the perceived degree of threats and prevent 
operations from amounting to an abuse of process, Mr. Big operations have decreased the use of 
intra-organizational violence (violence against members within the same organization), and have 
begun to solely commit violent acts against those outside of the organization (R v MM, 2015, p. 
19; R v Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 11). Nonetheless, Ledesma argues that although the violence was 
not openly directed towards him, he still felt indirectly and incidentally threatened (R v Ledesma, 
2020, p. 21-22). It is important to mention that Ledesma was tasked with spying on another 
member of the same organization, finding “dirt” on this member, and subsequently having that 
member discharged (R v Ledesma, 2020, p. 5). Though the member was not treated with 
violence, this demonstrates that members of your own organization cannot be trusted.  
Ledesma testified that although he originally felt paranoid that “Jason” was a police 
officer, he later came to believe that Jason was actually a gangster, and that, according to him, a 
gangster is a person who is not afraid to take part in violent acts (R v Ledesma, 2020. P. 21). 
Given this, he stated that his confessions were lies because he thought that for the organization to 
accept him and to consider him to also be a gangster, he had to prove himself by seeming to have 
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taken part in violent acts (R v Ledesma, 2020, p. 21). He acknowledged that he was never 
personally threatened, but emphasized that through the criminal organization’s involvement in a 
series of extremely violent acts, he knew that these gangsters were inherently capable of 
inflicting violence on him if they wanted to (R v Ledesma, 2020, p. 21). He also stated that he 
personally believed that if he messed up he would be subjected to violence; although other 
members of the organization were not subjected to violence, he assumed that they that had 
earned their positions because of their loyalty, and they had never “screwed up” (R v Ledesma, 
2020, p. 21). Even though Jason once stated “we don’t hurt our own,” Ledesma respectfully 
responded that he did not believe him (R v Ledesma, 2020, p. 21). He compared the operation to 
what is portrayed in the movies, in that it is common knowledge that in any criminal 
organization, anyone who betrays the trust of the criminal organization is punished with violence 
(R v Ledesma, 2020, p. 21). Ledesma stated that in his life, and having been to jail, he has seen 
people be treated with extreme violence after getting expelled from a gang, so even though he 
was not directly threatened, its implicitness was palpable, and one should not realistically expect 
anything less from any criminal organization (R v Ledesma, 2020, p. 21-22). The violence 
against individual’s outside of the organization is indirectly threatening.  
Suspect demeanor.  In R v MM, R v Yakimchuk, and R v Ledesma, the Alberta court 
testimony emphasized that throughout the execution of violent pseudo-crimes the suspects’ 
demeanors were “calm” or “appeared unbothered” (R v Ledesma, 2020, p. 21; R v Yakimchuk, 
2017, p. 3; R v MM, 2015, p. 24). This argument was used against them, and, under the R v Hart 
framework, lowered the perceived police “abuse of process” (R v Ledesma, 2020, p. 21; R v 
Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 3; R v MM, 2015, p. 24). In Bates’ autobiography, The Devil’s Pupil, he 
draws attention to the fact that he felt he needed to “act cool” while he was among legitimate 
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gangsters (Bates, 2018, p. 121). In another scenario involving Bates and undercover officers, 
Bates highlights how he felt it necessary to behave ruthlessly (Bates, 2018, p. 122). This 
“ruthless” behavior played in the Crown’s favor. Ledesma’s defense claimed that he was merely 
“playing along out of fear” (R v Ledesma, 2020, p. 7). While in the presence of an assault, to 
prevent drawing attention to oneself and out of fear of having the violence turned towards 
oneself, an individual is likely to be very inclined to appear to remain calm to prove to the 
“gangsters” that he is trustworthy and unbothered by violence. Although this normalization could 
very well indicate a level of comfort around violent acts, it could also (1) simply signify that the 
individual has been exposed to violence in their life; or (2) be an indication of a survival skill or 
coping mechanism. Remember, in the world of crime, being perceived as a potential “rat” is the 
fundamental “what not to be.” Thus, when in the presence of violent crime, anyone with basic 
survival instincts will display indifference to the violence, to prove to the perpetrator that they 
approve of, or even commend their conduct, to assure to the others that they are not a “snitch,” 
regardless of how uncomfortable they may feel.  
Mental health and vulnerability.  Psychologist, Dr. Timothy Moore, asserts that Mr. 
Big operations are extremely psychologically manipulative (Moore, 2019, p. 2). According to R 
v Hart, if the suspect suffers from addiction, mental health disorders, or is relatively young, an 
operative’s coercive behavior amounts to an abuse of process, by preying on one’s vulnerabilities 
(R v Hart, 2014, p. 590-591). Bates was diagnosed with substance use disorder, attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder, and anti-social personality disorder (R v Bates, 2009, p. 3-5). Bates’ 
mental health suffered as he became more paranoid after the Mr. Big operation, unable to 
distinguish police from non-police (Bates, 2018, p. 128; R v Bates, 2009, p. 6). 
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When interviewed by Mr. Big, Andy Rose sternly and consistently asserted his innocence 
as the officer stated that without his confession, he would not be able to help him (Keenan & 
Brockman, 2010, p. 9-10). Mr. Big ordered Rose to go to the lounge, have a beer, and think his 
story over (Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 10). Rose insisted that he was telling the truth and a 
beer would not change his story (Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 10). Rose’s lawyer argued that 
Rose was an alcoholic (Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 10). After hours of drinking, Rose 
eventually complied with the two officers’ request and stated: “We’ll go with I did it, okay?” 
(Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 10).   
In R v Ledesma, throughout the course of the operation, Ledesma stated that he was 
addicted to alcohol and cannabis and used both substances daily (R v Ledesma, 2020, p. 13). His 
mother was a crack-cocaine user, for which she had been incarcerated, and his father, who also 
suffered from addiction, had attended residential schools (R v Ledesma, 2020, p. 12). Undercover 
officers frequently brought Ledesma to liquor stores and provided him with money to purchase 
alcohol (R v Ledesma, 2020, p. 13). Ledesma was highly intoxicated on numerous undercover 
scenarios (R v Ledesma, 2020, p. 13). In fact, Ledesma was provided with so much alcohol by 
undercover officers prior to his meeting with Mr. Big that he vomited twice before arriving to the 
location of his Mr. Big interrogation, where he was given even more alcohol by Mr. Big (R v 
Ledesma, 2020, p. 13). Though inapplicable, R v Singh (2007) requires an  individual to have an 
operating mind when being interrogated by police (R v Singh, 2007, p. 420). This was 
tantamount to preying on one’s vulnerabilities and should have amounted to an abuse of process. 
Those who suffer from mental health are at a much higher risk of falsely confessing (R v Hart, 
2014, p. 586). Substance use disorder is a valid mental health concern. 
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False Confession 
A confession is considered to be very powerful evidence of guilt (R v Ledesma, 2020, p. 
10). Given all of the contributing factors of a Mr. Big operation, the suspect is given little choice 
but to confess (R v Hart, 2014, p. 611). Of all wrongful convictions, 16 percent are attributed to 
false confessions (Larmour, Bergstrøm, Christopher, Gillen, & Forth, 2014, p. 94). A trier of fact 
is more susceptible to believing a video admission of guilt than an explanation that the 
circumstances under which the confession was provided were coercive (Schleichkorn, 2013, p. 
394).  
Of the 75 percent of  Mr. Big operations that produce confessions, 95 percent result in a 
conviction (Holmgren, 2017, p. 155). The “are you tough enough” attitude of Mr. Big operations 
induces embellishment (R v Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 12). The nature of Mr. Big operations teaches 
suspects that a violent past is a boast-worthy achievement (R v Hart, 2014, p. 574). In R v 
Beaulac (1988), the accused testified that to be socially accepted by the fictitious syndicate, his 
confession was “pure bragging” (Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 18). The suspect may be 
prompted to please Mr. Big by saying what he thinks Mr. Big wants to hear, he may also confess 
to avoid aggravating the crime boss (Moore, 2019, p. 7; R v MM, 2015, p. 2). 
Quid pro quo.  Suspects are taught that providing a confession is (1) consequence-free, 
and (2) the ticket into a rewarding organization (R v Hart, 2014, p. 574). Suspects are offered a 
solution that will relieve them of any legal responsibility in exchange for a confession (R v 
Wytyshyn, 2002, para. 6; R v MM, 2015, p. 21; R v MM, 2012, p. 44-46). A suspect, knowing he 
or she is facing potential apprehension, whether or not they have committed the crime, may 
accept the quid pro quo for fear that they will be found guilty anyhow; the same reason innocent 
people would settle for a plea bargain. Wytyshyn (2002) argued that his confession video should 
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be inadmissible as he was given motives to lie, (1) to prove himself as worthy to the criminal 
organization and impress the undercover officers, and (2) the police offered to help frame 
another individual which would free him of any legal responsibility (R v Wytyshyn, 2002, para. 
6). 
 Leading questions.  A leading question is one that indirectly encourages an interviewee 
to respond in a certain way regardless of the truth (Schulenberg, 2016, p. 423). In Mr. Big 
interviews, all denials of guilt are rejected as lies while the importance of trust between members 
is emphasized (R v Hart, 2014, p. 572). A forced-choice question is when the context in which 
the question is asked assumes that one answer is more correct than another (Holmgren, 2017, p. 
285). This is a type of leading question that has the power to influence the confession and its use 
is discouraged by forensic interviewer, Dr. Holmgren (2017, p. 285). Mr. Big will frequently 
inform his interviewee that he has insider information of what occurred and for the suspect to 
prove his trustworthiness, he must produce the same information (R v Hart, 2014, p. 571-572). 
Suggestive questions are defined as questions that imply to the interviewee that there is a correct 
answer (Holmgren, 2017, p. 274). Dr. Holmgren (2017) advises that these type of questions must 
be avoided in forensic interviews (p. 274).  
Confessing for Financial Reasons 
All Mr. Big operations feature financial inducement (R v Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 11). 
Coercion would evidently occur if the suspect is so impoverished that they are obliged to make 
false self-incriminating statements as a survival mechanism. Moore (2019) describes Mr. Big 
operations as a “ticket out of poverty” (p. 8). In R v Ledesma, the accused sold crack cocaine, but 
was described as very poor, he was unable to pay for his cell-phone that would frequently run out 
of minutes, despite being paid $6350 by officers, he had to borrow money from the primary 
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undercover officer (R v Ledesma, 2020, p. 15-17). In R v MM, $80,000 was placed before of him 
during his Mr. Big interview (R v MM, 2012, p. 34). Allgood was bribed with the possibility of 
earning $25,000 if he continued to work for the organization (R v Allgood, 2015, p. 15). One may 
have more financial reasons to confess than to not; such as MM who had two dependents with 
two separate mothers to support financially (Moore, 2019, p. 9; R v MM, 2012, p. 28; R v MM, 
2015, p. 18). Unger, a proven wrongful conviction, stated that his confessions were lies because 
the officers glorified murder, so he felt that admitting to murdering someone would increase his 
chance of being accepted by the gang and receiving large sums of money (R v Unger, 1993, p. 
11; Puddister and Riddell, 2012, p. 391).  
The person may have become reliant on the new income, adapted to the glamourous 
lifestyle, or adopted some expensive habits. Yakimchuk said he felt that he had been preyed on 
financially, but this idea was rejected because he both had a job, and trafficked drugs on the side, 
from which he had profited (R v Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 11). In Yakimchuk’s case, another member 
of the organization, was fired, free of violent punishment; yet he did endure economic 
punishment as he was required to return both his vehicle and house keys to the criminal 
organization (R v Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 3). When testifying about the confession, Yakimchuk 
stated that he lied to impress the operatives (R v Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 7). He knew that this 
opportunity with these operatives could potentially be extremely lucrative, so he wanted them to 
think he was intelligent (R v Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 7). To demonstrate his intelligence he claimed 
to have falsely described how he orchestrated, planned, and executed a murder all while 
successfully covering up his tracks (R v Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 7).  
The gradual increase of the suspect’s wage as the tasks become illegal combined with the 
overtly glamourous wealthy depictions of the other members of the organization, and the 
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hundreds of thousands in cash that the suspect is exposed to—and often paid to count—would be 
an attractive trap to almost anyone (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 6; Smith et al., 2010, p. 39; R v 
Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 11; Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 20). Hart’s case was egregious. One 
mustn’t be intermittently homeless, or the deffinition of poor to be negatively motivated by 
money. Individuals who have money can still have inherently greedy traits, namely, wanting 
more money than they already have. The very fact that this operation lures its suspects by paying 
them is coercive in and of itself. However, not according to the R v Hart framework (R v 
Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 11). Under R v Hart, a suspect being unemployed does not suffice to render 
a confession unreliable (R v Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 11; R v Allgood, 2015). Allgood, Johnston, 
MM, Ledesma, and West were all unemployed at the time of the Mr. Big operation (R v Allgood, 
2015, p. 15; R v West, 2015, p. 27 & 31; Johnston, 2016, p. 16). In all five of these cases, this 
fact was not used against the reliability of the confession, nor to deem the suspect vulnerable (R v 
Allgood, 2015, p. 15; R v West, 2015, p. 27 & 31; R v Johnston, 2016, p. 16 & 18).  
The Mr. Big operation strategy is to have the suspect believe that the fictitious criminal 
organization is capable of solving any financial problems the suspect may have (Schleichkorn, 
2013, p. 389). They then have the suspect begin to rely on the extravagant lifestyle and pay rate 
(Schleichkorn, 2013, p. 389). Once dependent, the loss of his or her valued job is threatened 
(Schleichkorn, 2013, p. 389). The suspect may keep his or her beneficial job so long as he or she 
provides a confession (Schleichkorn, 2013, p. 389). This should lead anyone to question the  
authenticity of a confession provided under this context.    
Job interview.  The filmed conversation between the suspect and Mr. Big has been 
described as a job interview (R v Hart, 2014, p. 545; Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 20). When 
being interviewed for a job, one is likely to emphasize the traits that would qualify them for the 
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position they are applying for. The interviewee is ultimately trying to impress their interviewer. 
Some may be prone to embellishment, exaggeration, or even blatantly lying about their work 
experience in order to ensure they are granted the position. In fact, studies find that 85 percent of 
people lie on their resumes (O’Donnell, 2017, para. 1). Canada, being a capitalistic, competitive 
society, most individuals are lucratively motivated to improve their quality of life. Even if an 
individual is currently employed, they may be unhappy with their current employment. If 
employment with undercover officers portrays promising opportunities for advancement, early 
retirement options, and overall extremely attractive working conditions, the suspect may be 
willing to say whatever it takes to secure this promotion (R v Buckley, 2018, p. 6). Note that the 
officers, unlike a normal job, have been intentionally, psychologically luring this specific 
individual (Keenan & Brockman, 2010, p. 19). 
Wrongly Charged 
Bates’ story illustrates how easily an aspiring gangster can be duped into making false 
incriminating statements to impress what he thinks are members of a high ranking criminal 
organization, and to easily secure excessive amounts of money. Although Bates was culpable of 
other crimes and was by no means an innocent individual, his story is an example of how 
exceptionally expensive Mr. Big operations may, more frequently than known, be launched on 
the wrong perpetrator. Bates was fortunate to have Gittens, the trigger puller, come forward 
(Bates, 2018, p. 156). However, this leads anyone to wonder how many other Mr. Big 
interviewees have made false confessions and were not as lucky as Bates. The lack of reported 
cases of Mr. Big related wrongful convictions has been deemed extremely concerning by 
Supreme Court of Canada Judge Moldaver; however, Bates’ case is one of few Mr. Big 
operations that resulted in a known false confession where the accused was initially wrongly 
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charged (R v Hart, 2014, p. 572-573; Holmgren, 2017, p. 156). Bates’ case has been used in the 
defense of other cases such as R v Worme, to emphasize how Mr. Big interviewees are 
susceptible to exaggeration and boastful false confessions (R v Worme, 2016, p. 3 & 6).   
Miscarriage of Justice 
The Merriam-Webster (2020) dictionary defines a miscarriage of justice as an unjust 
outcome of a judicial hearing, particularly, an error that leads to either a guilty person being free 
or an innocent person being punished. The purpose of Mr. Big operations is to produce a 
confession. At times, the confession may be the only evidence. Though it is analyzed, if 
improperly interpreted, a false confession can autonomously wrongly or wrongfully convict an 
individual. When Mr. Big cases are tried, to explain why a suspect has confessed falsely, the 
accused is required to testify (R v Hart, 2014, p. 577). This is problematic because the trier of 
fact is initially presented with a dishonest depiction of the accused, an individual undeserving of 
being trusted (R v Hart, 2014, p. 577).   
Wrongly Convicting 
R v MM (2015) is an example of how the false confessions elicited from Mr. Big 
operations risk, not only wrongfully convicting, but wrongly convicting an individual. MM did 
participate in the murder of “Dave,” he is not innocent. Yet, he had no motive, and had never met 
the deceased. Research finds that more frequently than not, victims know their murderer; one is 
less likely to be killed by a stranger (Cao, Hou, & Huang, 2007, p. 9).  
There was substantially more situational evidence pointing towards “Carl.” Yet, MM’s 
Mr. Big confession alone persuaded both judges. Police had received information from several 
informants that “Carl” had pulled the trigger. The deceased, “Dave,” had stabbed “Carl” the 
previous year. MM accompanied “Carl” to what he believed was to physically assault “Dave.” 
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“Carl,” who had a very apparent motive to kill “Dave,” had fled to Venezuela from where he 
could not be extradited (R v MM, 2015, p. 23). MM had made several comments to undercover 
investigators about disposing of evidence (R v MM, 2015, p. 23). It is evident that MM had not 
pulled the trigger but had helped dispose of the weapon. A more accurate charge under the 
Canadian Criminal Code would have been Section 463, accessory after the fact. When applying 
the R v Hart rules to MM’s case, the active comparison between MM and Hart’s personal 
circumstance backfired. MM was failed by the manner in which this court applied the R v Hart 
rules to his appeal.  
Wrongful Conviction 
Supreme Court Justice Micheal Moldaver stated that the prejudicial effects that Mr. Big 
operations create in conjunction with the unreliability of a confession is a considerable concern 
(Holmgren, 2017, p. 156). Placing unreliable and prejudicial evidence before a jury is an 
invitation for a wrongful conviction (Holmgren, 2017, p. 156; R v Hart, 2014, p. 577). Judge 
Moldaver stated in his decision in R v Hart, that he finds the lack of proven miscarriages of 
justice linked to Mr. Big cases unsettling (R v Hart, 2014, p. 577). The law should take all 
possible precautions to prevent wrongful convictions as oppose to addressing them after they 
have already occurred (Kassin et al., 2010, p. 49; R v Hart, 2014, p. 577). Given the degree to 
which police-induced confessions have be chastised and the prevalence of confession-based 
wrongful convictions, the Mr. Big technique poses an immense risk of injustice (Larmour et al., 
2014, p. 94). In 2009, Canadian officials stated that Unger’s 1992 conviction had been a 
miscarriage of justice (Puddister and Riddell, 2012, p. 391). However, the use of the Mr. Big 
tactic and the false confession was publicly suppressed and the error was alluded to the obsolete 
and flawed DNA evidence of the time (Puddister and Riddell, 2012, p. 391).  
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R v Unger (1993) - Mr. Big exoneration.  In 1990, the body of 16-year-old Brigitte 
Grenier was found in a wooded area near a rock music festival (R v Unger, 1993, p. 2). She had 
been viciously sexually assaulted, sticks had been forced inside of her, she had been strangled, 
and suffered from multiple blows to the head (R v Unger, 1993, p. 3-4). Timothy Houlahan, age 
17, was seen kissing and dancing with Grenier earlier in the evening (R v Unger, 1993, p. 2). 
Kyle Unger, age 19, knew Grenier and had made comments to others about wanting to sleep with 
her (R v Unger, 1993, p. 2). All three had attended the concert separately (R v Unger, 1993, p. 2).  
Houlahan who was scratched up and covered in mud informed police that he had had 
consensual intercourse with Grenier; but later in the evening, was approached by a man, fitting 
the description of Unger, who attacked him and left him unconscious for some hours (R v Unger, 
1993, p. 60). Unger had no dirt on his clothes, nor scratches, nor bruises (Innocence Canada, 
2020, para. 4). Forensic scientists stated that hair fragments found on the deceased body matched 
both Unger and Houlahan (R v Unger, 1993, p. 5). Note that the DNA evidence used to draw 
these conclusions was outdated and this was later scientifically proven to be wrong (Innocence 
Canada, 2020, para. 22). 
In 1991, the RCMP launched a Mr. Big operation on Unger (Innocence Canada, 2020, 
para. 14; R v Unger, 1993, p. 6). He met Officer 1 who offered him promising Mafia-like 
opportunities and spoke highly of Officer 2, Mr. Big (R v Unger, 1993, p. 9). Unger was 
described as nervous and eager to make a good first impression on Mr. Big (R v Unger, 1993, p. 
9). When introduced to Unger, Mr. Big stated: “ [Officer 1] tells me you whacked somebody. 
That’s fine with me. That’s fuckin’ excellent. It’s the kind of thing that, uh, know that I’m 
dealing with somebody that’s on my fuckin’…somebody that I can trust… that’s the kind of 
person I’m looking for [sic]” (R v Unger, 1993, p. 9). Unger then enthusiastically confessed to 
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF MR. BIG OPERATIONS 70 
the murder and was then brought to the scene of the crime where he contradicted himself (R v 
Unger, 1993, p. 9). In court, Unger argued that police encouraged him to confess to the murder 
regardless of whether it was true or false (R v Unger, 1993, p. 21).  
RCMP interviewed more than twenty inmates in hopes of finding a jailhouse informant to 
testify that Unger had confessed to them (Innocence Canada, 2020, p. 12). For which they were 
successful, Jeffrey Cohen agreed (R v Unger, 1993, p. 7) Cohen was likely given an incentive to 
testify against Unger; Cohen later testified that he had originally lied (Innocence Canada, 2020, 
para. 13 & 27).  
Unger and Houlahan were both charged and convicted with first degree murder (R v 
Unger, 1993, p. 6). Houlahan, was tried as an adult (R v Unger, 1993, p. 6) When appealing their 
convictions, Unger’s request was denied and Houlahan was ordered a new trial (R v Unger, 
2020, p. 72; Innocence Canada, 2020, para. 20). When released on bail, Houlahan committed 
suicide (Sherrer, n.d, p.1; Innocence Canada. 2020, para. 20). Houlahan was cleared in 1994 
(Sherrer, n.d., p.1). In 2004, new scientific breakthroughs were discovered demonstrating the 
inaccuracy of prior forensics used to link hair to suspects (Innocence Canada, 2020, para. 21). 
Innocence Canada then filed a review of Unger’s conviction and a new trial was ordered 
(Innocence Canada, 2020, para. 24). In 2005, Unger was granted bail (Innocence Canada, 2020, 
para. 25). He was later officially exonerated in 2009 (Innocence Canada, 2020, para. 25). Unger 
lost 14 years of his life. 
He was wrongfully convicted because of police use of jailhouse informants, tunnel vision, 
bad science, and a false confession obtained through a Mr. Big operation (Innocence Canada, 
2020, para. 25-38). Unger has since filed a $14.5 million wrongful conviction lawsuit against the 
RCMP officers (Grabish, 2019, para. 1).  
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Post-R v Hart Exoneration – Wade Skiffington.  On January 23, 2019 Wade 
Skiffington was found wrongfully convicted of the 1994 murder of his fiancée (R v Skiffington, 
2019, p. 3). Skiffington was subjected to a Mr. Big operation in 1999, by which he was later 
charged of second degree murder and given a life sentence (R v Skiffington, 2019, p. 3). After the 
R v Hart decision, Skiffington’s case was reopened, scrutinized with the R v Hart conditions, and 
he was exonerated (R v Skiffington, 2019, p. 4 & 12). Skiffington wrongfully spent more than 17 
years of his life in prison (Innocence Canada, 2019, para. 5). Experts on wrongful conviction 
from Innocence Canada (2019) state that this was a “classic” case of police tunnel-vision, as 
there was no investigation into alternative suspects (para. 9).  
PART THREE – Conclusion and Discussion 
As opposed to thoroughly following the instructions outlined in R v Hart and analyzing 
cases at face value, cases are frequently compared to the severity of Hart’s personal circumstance 
which, by contrast, leads courts to condone the Mr. Big operation. Every case must be analyzed 
based on its own facts (R v Yakimchuk, 2017, p. 9). Despite that the specific conditions of a case 
may not have been as severe as Hart’s, the possibility that one embellished or exaggerated their 
confession in an attempt to make a good impression on people who appear to have powerful 
resources and who commend violent behavior, cannot be ruled out beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Anyone presented with a motivation (fiscal, fearful, or simply ego), not only an individual who is 
categorized as excessively vulnerable, is also at risk of being manipulated into making a false 
confession at the hand of highly skilled police officers conducting a Mr. Big operation. 
The cost of Mr. Big operations continues to outweigh its benefits. Although the R v Hart 
decision thoroughly addressed multiple concerns and has filtered out several unreliable 
confessions, it does not exhaustively solve every grievance associated with the Canadian 
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technique. Some of this can be alluded to the many grievances that do not concern the court, but 
the police agencies conducting the operations. Police should be monitored, to a greater extent, by 
police oversight bodies.  
Undercover police instructing a suspect to consume alcohol, then further questioning the 
individual once they are intoxicated is very concerning and leads one to question the reliability 
of a confession elicited from an inebriated person. More legal protections need to be placed on 
the use of alcohol as a tool for police to extract information.  
An asset of Mr. Big operations is that they can address cold cases. However, after the 
police has exerted an excess of police resources over a course of several months and hired 
dozens of officers to elicit a confession out of one potential suspect for that confession to later be 
deemed inadmissible in court, the Mr. Big operation has now created a cold case. The offender is 
either still at large, or the police abuse of process in the Mr. Big operation has freed the guilty. 
The R v Hart decision did not address tunnel vision as it does not impose standards that the 
police are required to meet prior to launching a Mr. Big operation. All known persons present at 
the scene of the crime and potential suspects should be thoroughly eliminated prior to launching 
a Mr. Big operation.  
Greater stringency should be placed on the admissibility of a confession. At trial, all 
undercover officer violence should be evaluated as a potential abuse of process, including 
exposing a suspect to violence towards persons outside of the criminal organization. Financial 
inducements must be scrutinized to a greater extent. The reduction of direct violence which led 
to the enhancement of economic prestige in the operation has likely decreased the degree to 
which one is confessing out of fear; yet the need to confess to make a good impression or as a 
form of following an employer’s orders remains prevalent. Anyone’s integrity should be 
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questioned when enticed with financial incentives by individuals encouraging an admission of 
guilt. 
The lack of public access to recordings of the operation makes research in this area highly 
dependent on written cases. Some cases compose a comprehensive, detailed application of the R 
v Hart rules, such as the R v Yakimchuk (2017) and the R v Ledesma (2020) case. Others simply 
mention whether the prongs passed or failed such as the R v RK (2016) youth case (R v RK, 
2016, p. 10-11).    
This research does not conclude that Ledesma and Yakimchuk falsely confessed, it 
merely states that this very uncertainty as to whether or not they did, even after being analyzed 
through the R v Hart framework, is problematic. Each defense makes strong, realistic arguments 
that could occur to any other person in the same position. Though the courts did subjectively 
weight the probative value against its prejudicial effects, as well as any abuse of process. There 
continues to be a risk, which is unacceptable.  
Most of the research was relatively case-based and did not consist of interactions with the 
public, but was rather an assembling of case information. The research conducted on Mr. Big is 
primarily contextual and explains the characteristics, and controversial aspects of Mr. Big 
operations by relating it to prior cases. It is almost completely qualitative with the exception of 
one quantitative survey.  
The frequency of plea bargains used in Mr. Big cases should be further investigated. 
Lastly, the topic of Mr. Big requires more primary research. Canadian opinions that are 
representative of the population, personal accounts of RCMP and police officers’ views, and a 
fulsome perspective of individual suspects targeted by Mr. Big operations should be studied. 
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